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SPEECH IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
DIFFERENT CONTEXT OR DIFFERENT RIGHTS?
Jonathan yle*
Many times over the last fifteen years, public school students have
taken their schools to court over the right to wear messages on their
clothing. Judges have pondered whether the First Amendment pro-
tects messages like "Drugs Suck!,"' "Unfair Grades," "Racism," "I Hate
Lost Creek,"2 and "Scab";3 visual depictions of school officials in a
drunken state,4 a three-faced Jesus,5 and the Confederate Flag;6 adver-
tisements for alcoholic beverages;7 rosary beads;8 baggy pants in-
tended to express black identity; and a tattoo of a cross.
My brother and I were part of this group of litigants. When we
were in high school, we tested a new dress code by wearing a variety
of message shirts. I was sent home after testing the school's dress
code with "See Dick Drink. See Dick Drive. See Dick Die. Don't Be
a Dick," a well-intended message T-shirt which nonetheless contained
what the school board called a reference to male genitalia that would
have been permissible if instead it read "Don't Be Like Dick." My
brother was given detention for "Co-Ed Naked Band: Do It to the
Rhythm" and sent home for "Co-Ed Naked Civil Liberties."" With the
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2 Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 1994).
3 Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992) (concerning a message
that appeared in the midst of a teacher strike).
Gano v. Sch. Dist., 674 F. Supp. 796 (D. Idaho 1987).
Boroffv. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000) (involving several shirts
from Marilyn Manson concerts).
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1I was not sent home for "Coed Naked Gerbils: Some People Will Censor Anything" or
"Coed Naked Censorship: They Do It in South Hadley," but I was sent to the principal's office
by teachers who assumed that the words "Coed Naked" were per se lewd. The principal would
have sent me home the day I wore "Smith College Centennial: A Century of Women on Top,"
but the superintendent overruled him. My brother wore a shirt picturing two men kissing and
the caption "READ MY LIPS," and the same teacher who gave him detention for "Coed Naked
Band" permitted him to wear it. The teacher also allowed a shirt with a marijuana leaf and the
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help of the American Civil Liberties Union, we won judgments
against two clauses of our school's dress code: one that prohibited
messages considered "harassing, intimidating, or demeaning," which
was used against "Co-Ed Naked" shirts,12 and another that banned
messages considered "obscene, lewd, or vulgar. iM
My brother and I received feedback about our lawsuit from a vari-
ety of sources around New England: editorials and letters to the edi-
tor; hate mail and anonymous angry phone calls; audiences at school
board meetings, teacher conferences and student government con-
ferences; and most importantly, private discussions with the defen-
dants in the lawsuit, the school board members and the school dis-
trict superintendent. We found that we could not count on support
or opposition from any particular group. Students overwhelmingly
supported my brother and me, but many believed that offensive
speech ought to be prohibited. Although we were aiming to limit the
discretion of teachers, many teachers were enthusiastic about our
lawsuit. Although the ACLU championed our case, as many "liberals"
were against us as "conservatives." We heard a wide range of ration-
ales for and against having dress and speech codes, but we heard little
respect for-or even understanding of-the First Amendment as a
mandate for the toleration of offensive speech. One teacher ex-
plained to us that the Bill of Rights is merely a "mission statement,"
not a law.
Much of the public opinion about the case turned on considera-
tions of proportionality. Some thought the school was silly to expend
resources battling innocuous T-shirts, while others thought my
brother and I were irresponsible for trivializing the First Amendment
by applying it to frivolous messages. Both of these rationales disre-
gard the central question, which is how much the First Amendment
ought to constrain the ability of school officials to use coercive meth-
caption "Legalize it." My brother and I informed the teachers who confronted us that if anyone
told us they were personally offended by any of our shirts, we would stop wearing them. Inter-
estingly, nobody ever claimed to be offended.
12 Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157 (D. Mass. 1994). See also Pyle v. S. Hadley
Sch. Comm., 55 F.3d 20 (Ist Cir. 1994) (certifying the question of a Massachusetts student free
expression statute to state court); Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 824 F. Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1993)
(denying motion for temporary restraining order on the grounds that school officials have
broad power to prevent sexual harassment).
is Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 667 N.E.2d 869 (Mass. 1996). The court struck down the
"vulgarity" clause on the basis of a state statute that provided:
The right of students to freedom of expression in the public schools of the common-
wealth shall not be abridged, provided that such right shall not cause any disruption or
disorder within the school. Freedom of expression shall include without limitation, the
rights and responsibilities of students, collectively and individually, (a) to express their
views through speech and symbols, (b) to write, publish and disseminate their views, (c)
to assemble peaceably on school property for the purpose of expressing their opinions.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 82 (1994).
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ods to confront seriously offensive speech. Our case involved "Coed
Naked Band" in fact, but in effect it involved messages that could be
racist, sexist, derogatory, emotionally disturbing, or otherwise utterly
inappropriate. Although my brother and I received a great deal of
public support for our cause, I suspect that we would have received
much less if the public better understood that we were questioning
not what kinds of message shirts should be considered "okay" to wear
in school, but were arguing that the Constitution makes the reason-
able person's measure of appropriateness irrelevant and denies
school officials the power to curtail any student speech that is not ma-
terially disruptive.
This Comment appears in a law journal, so it will not attempt to
balance the educational rationales for and against the right to wear
nasty T-shirts. However, the public policy rationales against free
speech that I heard from teachers, students, parents, and concerned
citizens are not wholly irrelevant to the constitutional legal question
of the speech rights of students. The legal standard we insisted on,
material disruption, is itself a policy, and other policies might also ex-
cuse schools from tolerating certain messages. As the Constitution
shifts the burden to the state to justify restrictions on speech, this
Comment will not reiterate the worthy ACLU arguments for free
speech and John Dewey-esque arguments for liberal education1 4 that
my brother and I trotted out to defend our point of view.
Policies other than the prevention of disruption have crept into
court opinions over the last fifteen years. The last time the Supreme
Court spoke directly on the issue of student free expression rights was
in the 1988 case of Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier.5 The Court drew a line
between "school-sponsored" speech like the student newspaper at is-
sue, which it deemed regulable for any reason, and non-disruptive
independent student speech, which could only be prohibited if it
16caused disruption. In the intervening years, many courts, purport-
ing to rely on precedent, disregarded this distinction and allowed
schools to regulate extensively the passive, non-disruptive expressions
of students. The Sixth Circuit recently held that Ohio school officials
were entitled to prohibit the wearing of Marilyn Manson T-shirts on
the ground that the lyrics in Marilyn Manson's music were inconsis-
17tent with the values the school sought to promote. A district courtin Virginia approved a school's punishment of a middle schooler for
14 See generallyJOHN DEWEY, FREEDOMAND CULTURE (1939); Lawrence Kohlberg & Carol Gil-
ligan, The Adolescent as Philosopher: The Discovery of the Self in a Postconventional World, in TWELVE
TO SIXTEEN: EARLYADOLESCENCE 144 (Jerome Kagan & Robert Coles eds., 1972).
1s Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (involving official censorship of
articles in a school newspaper).
16 Id. at 271.
17 Boroffv. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000).
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wearing a "Drugs Suck" T-shirt on the ground that it referred to oral
sex. 8 These courts hold official school censors to a standard several
orders of magnitude less strict than the standards to which they
would hold federal and state officials who prohibit, or even merely
chill, the speech of adults. Yet students supposedly have First
Amendment rights as a matter of law.
The case my brother and I brought is representative of the trend.
The federal district court struck down on constitutional grounds only
the "harassing, intimidating, or demeaning" speech clause, not the
vulgarity clause. We had to go to state court to get the latter clause
struck down on state statutory grounds because the district court
found in case law a vulgarity-in-schools exception to the First
Amendment. 19 Certainly the First Amendment has substantial mean-
ing for students if a well-intentioned anti-harassment school rule can
be ruled unconstitutional. That makes the vulgarity-in-schools excep-
tion peculiar. Although it makes sense that "Kill Niggers" on a T-shirt
is more deserving of censorship than "Kill African-Americans," it is
counterintuitive that a "Mean People Suck" shirt is prohibitable while
"Kill African-Americans" is free speech.
The Supreme Court is partly responsible for the confusion in the
lower courts. Having considered just three major cases concerning
the free speech rights of students, it has hardly begun to consider
the wide range of First Amendment issues that arise in schools and
has left lower courts to perform constitutional analysis on the basis of
insufficient Court precedent.21 In the process of fitting novel fact pat-
terns into the mold of the issues the Court has considered, lower
courts have made holdings directly inconsistent with the Court's
rules.22 Because these wayward interpretations have tended to stray
rightward from those of the liberal Warren Court, the Rehnquist
Court, not surprisingly, has been content to let these decisions stand.
The purpose of this Comment is to show that the limits on school
authority can be discerned from the larger body of First Amendment
18 Broussard v. Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Va. 1992).
19 Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 824 F. Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1993) (holding that school officials
were not barred by the Constitution from prohibiting "vulgar" messages on clothing). See gener-
ally Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse Gates?,
48 DRAKE L. REV. 527 (2001); Mary Kuhn, Student Dress Codes in the Public Schools: Multiple Per-
spectives in the Courts and Schools on the Same Issues, 25 J.L. & EDUC. 83 (1996); Wendy Mahling,
Secondhand Codes: An Analysis of the Constitutionality of Dress Codes in the Public Schools, 80 MINN. L.
REV. 715 (1996); Alison Barbarosh, Undressing the First Amendment in Public Schools: Do Uniform
Dress Codes Violate Students'Fist Amendment Rights? 28 LOY. LA L. REV. 1415 (1995).
20 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260; Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (involving
the punishment of a student for making an uncouth speech at a high school assembly); Tinker,
393 U.S. at 503 (involving a student's right to wear an anti-war armband).
21 See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 77-85 and accompanying text.
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case law, and not only from the few cases that have directly con-
cerned students. When considering the constitutionality of a school
speech regulation, one need only ask, "As a matter of constitutional
law, would the expression be protected if it was made by an adult in
an analogous situation?" If the answer is yes, then ask, "Is the school
context different in relevant ways so that the same protections ought
not apply?" This approach respects students as constitutional per-
sons, promotes the value of consistency, employs a broad base of legal
precedent, and leads to relatively consistent results. Lower courts fol-
low this approach in some areas of student rights, but not in others;
however, inconsistent application of this approach leads to constitu-
tional absurdities like the split decision in the Pyle case.23
This Comment considers several rationales courts have used to
distinguish students from adults and holds each to First Amendment
scrutiny. Students may be too young to hear or speak some mes-24 ..
sages. The school may have a special interest in teaching good25 .•• 26
manners, teaching academic lessons most effectively, promoting-27 28 - --
the school's values, or discouraging vulgarity. Finally, school offi-
cials may have an obligation to ensure a comfortable school envi-
ronment by prohibiting speech that might disrapt, harass,3° enflame• * 31
racial tensions, or inhibit students' ability to learn.32 This Comment
concludes that the "disruption" standard articulated by the Court in
Tinker v. Des Moines, the seminal student expression case, stands up
after thirty years of precedent as the standard that best balances the
interests of the school and the student.33
The scope of this Comment is limited to student speech and ex-
pression that is independent and passive, especially "message cloth-
ing" like slogan-bearing T-shirts. It does not consider school uniform
policies,34 student newspapers, 5 punishment of students who make
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 86-124 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 128-45 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
27See infa notes 153-80 and accompanying textSee infra notes 181-221 and accompanying text.
2See infa notes 230-42 and accompanying text.
30 See infra notes 245-86 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 287-97 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 298-310 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 311-24 and accompanying text.
34 Uniform policies avoid the constitutional problems of picking and choosing proper mes-
sages on clothing. Rather than the suppression of expression, they involve the coercion of ex-
pression, which has First Amendment implications of its own. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S.
705 (1977) (prohibiting New Hampshire from requiring citizens to display the motto "Live Free
or Die" on their license plates); Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that a
school may not force students to salute the flag). School uniform policies have usually been
upheld. Courts consider them to be content-neutral measures that serve educational interests.
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threats,3 the rights of teachers,37 or regulations with a colorable
health or safety basis. Nor does it consider expression on the border-
line of First Amendment "speech," like the wearing of hats. Those is-
sues raise interesting First Amendment questions, but the most con-
tentious and ambiguous issues in student free speech law concern.
passive and independent student expression that is not physically dis-
ruptive.
INTRODUCTION
A. Taking Student Rights Seriously
As a matter of policy as well as law, students deserve to be taken
seriously when they assert rights against school authority.ss Legal
See Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist, 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that uniform
policy violated no due process rights of students or their parents and the First Amendment was
not violated by depriving students of choice over their clothes because the action of wearing
clothes of one's choice is not an expressive activity); Long v. Bd. of Educ., 121 F. Supp. 2d 621
(W.D. Ky. 2000) (upholding uniform dress code on the ground it was content neutral and unre-
lated to the suppression of expression); Phoenix Elementary Sch. Dist. v. Green, 943 P.2d 836,
839 (Ariz. Ct App. 1997) (approving a dress code that prescribed white tops and blue bottoms
purchased atJ.C. Penney, even though it banned all logos other than those that might appear
on a polo shirt). But see R. Allan Homing, The First Amendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969 DUKE
L.J. 931 (1969) (arguing that individuals have a right to a forum even if regulations against the
forum are content-neutral). See generally Todd A. DeMitchell, School Uniforms and the Constitu-
tion: Common Dress in an Uncommon Time, 156 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2001); Joseph R. McKinney, A
New Look at Student Uniformn Policies, 140 EDUC. L. REP. 791 (2000).
n See; e.g., Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (involving cartoons in a university
newspaper); Bystrom v. Fridley High Sch. Indep. Sch. Dist., 822 F.2d 747 (8th Cir. 1987) (in-
volving attempt by officials to review an underground newspaper in advance for vulgarity and
indecency); Leeb v. Delong, 243 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that a school can
censor a school newspaper because it used a picture of someone without their permission in an
April Fools edition). This Comment necessarily discusses Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260
(1988), a Supreme Court student newspaper case that defined the contours of student expres-
sion rights.
See e.g., LaVine v. Blane Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001) (involving the expulsion
of a student who showed his teacher a poem he wrote about shooting his classmates and him-
self). See generallyJennifer L. Barnes, Students Under Siege? Constitutional Considerations for Public
Schools Concerned with School Safety, 34 U. RICH. L. REV 621 (2000); Clay Calvert, Free Speech and
Public Schools in a Postcolumbine World: Check Your Speech Rights at the Schoolhouse Metal Detector, 77
DENV. U. L. REV. 739 (2000); Lisa M. Pisciotta, Beyond Sticks and Stones: A First Amendment
Framework for Educators Who Seek To Punish Student Threats, 30 SErON HALL L. REV. 635 (2000);
Edward T. Ramey, Student Expression: The Legacy of Tinker in the Wake of Columbine, 77 DENY. U.
L. REV. 699 (2000).
37 See generally Gregory A. Carick, Public School Teachers and the First Amendment: Protecting the
Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1990); Stephen Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right
of Public School Teachers To Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1293 (1976);Jeffrey Wal-
len, Teachers, Not Advocates: Toward an Open Classroom, in ADVOCACY IN THE CLASSROOM 224
(Patricia Meyer Spacks ed., 1996); Merle H. Weiner, Dirty Words in the Classroom: Teaching the
Limits of the First Ameudment 66 TENN. L. REV. 597 (1999).
See supra note 13.
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analysis of student rights must apply the Constitution to the special
characteristics of the school environment, not simply carve out "de
minimis" exceptions to existing legal principles.3 Legal standards in
the realm of student free speech ought not to reduce immediately to
reasonableness and balancing; if they do, there must be a reason
other than the youth of the plaintiffs that would justify such a legal
standard.
Constitutional protection of student speech is not a mere legal
technicality; rather, it is based on the same values of distrust of gov-
ernment and counter-majoritarianism that motivate the protections
for adults.4 In this respect, the liberties of public school students are
very different from those of private school students or adults in the
workplace. One might argue that constitutional protections for stu-
dents serve no normative purpose because private school students
who go to school unprotected by the Constitution do not appear to
be suffering. However, most parents who send their children to pub-
lic school have neither the money for private school tuition nor the
time for home schooling.4' Because the public school operates by the
whims of local majoritarian politics,42 students learn what the local
popular majority wants them to learn. Parents who are upset with the
curriculum have recourse only to the political process, which will be
unavailing if their complaints are shared only by a minority. Unlike
more affluent parents, they do not have the option of taking their
In the early stages of the Pyle case,Judge Ponsor commented:
It is worth remembering that, whether this decision is correct or not, no other court sys-
tem in the world today, and none that has existed in the history of the world, would take
so much time to address the concerns of two high school students sent home over their
T-shirts. Whatever the outcome, claims of violation of free expression are given the
greatest attention, even when they arise in miniature, by this country, this judicial system
and this court.
Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 824 F. Supp. 7, 11 (D. Mass. 1993). See also Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch.
Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 158 (D. Mass. 1994) (Ponsor, J.) ("This case is a reminder that it is
easy to assume a tempest in a teapot is trivial, unless you happen to be in the teapot."). Not all
judges are so respectful. See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) ("The schools,
as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct
cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct
such as that indulged in by this confused boy.").
40 See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUR 86 (1982)
(noting that freedom of speech is founded on a distrust of government); STEVEN SHIFFRIN, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 59 (1990) ("No fair reading of the overall de-
sign of the Constitution can plausibly yield a notion that majority rule is a central feature of the
document.").
41 See Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 651 (1980) ("The economic
structure of education forces or at least encourages parents to select public education.").
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943) ("Such [school] Boards are numer-
ous and their territorial jurisdiction often small. But small and local authority may feel less
sense of responsibility to the Constitution, and agencies of publicity may be less vigilant in call-
ing it to account.").
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children out of a school that teaches their children improperly.#
Furthermore, when condemning ideas, public school officials bear a
moral authority that private school officials do not, because their ac-
tions carry the imprimatur of the community, not just that of a relig-
ious sect or a private educational institution. Thus, it cannot be ar-
gued that public schools do not need the Constitution just because
private schools function well without it. Just as it protects the rights
of criminals against a powerful government and an unsympathetic
popular majority, the Constitution protects parents and children
from a government that forces children to attend school and from a
popular majority that might not respect the way some students and
parents choose to live.
The availability ofjudicial review to students is normatively impor-
tant because of the compulsory nature of education. A careful legal
analysis has no place for the "common-sense" notion that school
boards are in charge of schools, and that courts should not, reductio
ad absurdum, have to act as a "super school board," adjudicating every
minor liberty deprivation that might occur in a school. Schools, like
jails, are distinguished from the public realm by their institutional
status. There is nothing abnormal or improper about lawsuits arising
out of institutional settings when rights-claimants have exhausted
their institutional remedies. The lawsuit is the only mechanism stu-
dents and parents have to enforce counter-majoritarian constitutional
provisions like the Free Speech Clause. Although it would be ideal if
disputes could be resolved within the school institution, courts have a
wholly proper task of second-guessing school board decisions.
44
It is easy to belittle the ways students express themselves and deem
them unworthy of constitutional protection.4 Many adults, who con-
form happily to workplace dress codes, look down on teenagers who
invest great time, energy, and thought in their personal appearance.
They forget, however, that teenagers also invest a great deal of ex-
pressive content in personal appearance. Clothes and haircuts do
not merely express quirky personal preferences, or follow arbitrary
fashions. Rather, they express and promote cultural allegiances.
Teenagers are able to pigeonhole one another accurately into cate-
gories, solely on the basis of appearance, in ways that adults cannot.46
See Shiffrin, supra note 41, at 651.
44In 1943, the Supreme Court was not scared by the prospect of federal courts acting as ap-
pellate school boards: "we cannot, because of modest estimates of our competence in such
specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that history authenticates as the function
of this Court when liberty is infringed." Barnete 319 U.S. at 640.
See, e.g., Mark Mathabane, Appearances Are Destruaive, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1993, at A21.
46 See generally PENELOPE EC=ERT, JOCKS AND BURNOUI: SOCIAL CATEGORIES AND IDENITIY
IN THE HIGH SCHOOL (1989).
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These categories correlate with distinct values and world views. 47
Thus, there is nothing innocuous about a school's regulation of
clothing. Such things are not trivial; they are important both to the
students, who choose them for a reason, and to the school adminis-
trators, who consider deviant modes of expression threatening.48 By
such regulations, the school is doing nothing less than promoting an
official school message and quashing dissent from that message. By
regulating style, schools strip some students but not others of the op-
portunity to promote the values of their youth culture to others, par-
ticularly those in different achievement levels or grades whom they
only pass in the hallway. Regulations of student dress present pre-
cisely the problems the First Amendment exists to redress.49 Legal
analysis should respect the complexity of the school's function, and
not assume that independent student speech is irrelevant to the
school's mission. The primary purpose of schools may seem to be the
teaching of academics, but it is also, and perhaps more importantly, a
forum for student interactions."4 Much (if not most) of what is
learned in school does not occur under the direction of teachers and
administrators. Students become friends, lovers, and enemies; they
learn inarticulable lessons for living. "Socialization" 51 is the term used
by sociologists for this process, which takes place at home, in church,
at the playground, but predominantly at school,52 both under the di-
rection of adults and independently. It is an extremely important
part of education because it reproduces social norms. Conflict be-
tween youth culture and adult culture is an inherent and necessary
part of this socialization. 53 Such conflict allows values to adapt to
47 See id.
43 See, e.g., Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding
that a Marilyn Manson T-shirt "promotes destructive conduct and demoralizing values that are
contrary to the educational mission of the school").
49 See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there
are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.
50 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) ("Among those
activities is personal intercommunication among the students.").
51 See generallyJohn A. Clausen, Perspectives on Childhood Socialization, in SOCIALIZATION AND
SOCEIY 130 (John A. Clausen ed., 1968).
52 Children spend much more time in school than at any other activity, including television.
Indeed, they may spend more time interacting with their teachers than with their parents. See
Sandra Hofferth &John Sandberg, Changes in American Children's Time, 1981-1997, University of
Michigan Populations Studies Center Research Report, at http: //Vvw.psc.lsa.umich.edu/pubs
/paXers/rr00-456.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2001).
See Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 197 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Educa-
tion is a kind of continuing dialogue, and a dialogue assumes, in the nature of the case, differ-
ent points of view." (quoting an educational scholar)); Mark G. Yudof, Library Book Selection and
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changed historical circumstances, and prevents moral faults from
passing to future generations. Neither side wins; the generations ne-
gotiate perpetually. There is nothing unilateral about the process of
education, when it is considered in its entirety.54 Therefore, when
judges consider whether student expression interferes with the edu-
cational process, they should not simply defer to the school officials'
perceptions of what the educational process is, nor should they think
only of desks and chalkboards.5 They should inquire more deeply
and consider how freedom might benefit the educational environ-
ment in ways that school officials lack the political capacity to rec-ognize.
B. Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has decided four cases, one with only a plu-
rality, on the issue of the free speech rights of public school students.
While the Court has decided over a hundred cases involving the free
speech rights of adults, these precedents, considered alone, give little
guidance to lower courtjudges.
The general contours of student speech rights are well-defined.
American public schools are state institutions,s and the Constitution
the Public Schools: The Quest for the Archimedean Point, 59 IND. LJ. 527, 528 (1984) (explaining
tha part of education involves giving young people the chance to reject adult values).
Although good teachers admit that they learn from their students as much as their stu-
dents learn from them,Justice Black, dissenting in Tinker, complained that "[tlhe original idea
of schools, which I do not believe is yet abandoned as worthless or out of date, was that children
had not yet reached the point of experience and wisdom which enabled them to teach all of
their elders." Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522.
In many poorly performing public schools, however, where teaching is a challenge of per-
suading students to stay at their desks and look at the chalkboard, deferring to school officials
manbe the best thing ajudge could do. Most schools do not have such problems.
See generally John Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 321, 338-51
(1979) (discussing the role of free speech in the process of growth).
57 See Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (holding on educational as well as
legal grounds that students ought to have freedom of opinion). Cf L. HARMON ZEIGLIER, THE
POLrICALWORLD OFTHE HIGH SCHOOLTEACHER 151 (1966) (observing that only older, expe-
rienced teachers address controversial topics). As any high school student knows, student ex-
pression most often has no effect on learning and teachers would rather tolerate what adminis-
trators, who have an immoderate concern for appearances, want them to regulate. In litigation,
unfortunately, teachers who might testify to such a disagreement have incentives to stay silent to
protect their jobs. One should be wary of self-serving testimony by school administrators that
regulation of student speech and dress improves an ineffable "school spirit." See, e.g., Berryman
v. Hein, 329 F. Supp. 616 (D. Idaho 1971) (finding that a superintendent's personal opinion
that students were distracted by a boy's long hair was insufficient to justify interference with the
boy's liberty interests).
Schools can only be understood as creations of the state, akin to municipal entities. See
Mount Healthy v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (holding that a school board was more like a
municipality than a state agency); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
512 n.6 (1969) (upholding the right of students to wear anti-war armbands). Although there is
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limits its exercise of power over the speech of students.0 Courts do
not agree on the extent of these limitations.6
There is no question that schools may prohibit expressions that
cause material and substantial disruptions in the school. In 1969, the
Court in Tinker v. Des Moines upheld the right of middle school stu-
dents to wear black armbands in opposition to the war in Vietnam.
The Court held that students must be allowed to voice their opinions
during school, although regulations on "pure speech"6 can "be justi-
fied by a showing that the students' activities would materially and
substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school."63 The dis-
ruption standard articulated in Tinker has become canonical.6
Students not only have the right to express their opinions in a
non-disruptive manner, according to the Supreme Court, but they
have freedom from censorship. In 1982, a plurality of the Court in
Board of Education v. Pico6 held that school officials could not remove
books from a school library "simply because they dislike the ideas
contained in those books and seek by their removal to 'prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion .... '" The application of Pico to cases of student
expression is limited, however, both by the fact that it was a plurality
decision, and by the fact that it did not address student speech.
A few years after Pico, the Court decided Bethel School District v.
Fraser,67 upholding a high school's suspension of a student for giving a
a strong tradition of local control of schools, no mere tradition releases courts from their re-
sponsibility to remedy violations of constitutional rights. See McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S.
668, 674 n.6 (1963) ("[w]herever the Federal courts sit, human rights under the Federal Consti-
tution are always a proper subject for adjudication") (citation omitted); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 487 (1960) ("The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital
than in the community of American schools."); Nitzberg v. Parks, 525 F.2d 378, 384 (4th Cir.
1975) (holding that First Amendment limitations are not always justified by school disciplinary
problems); Dodd v. Rambis, 535 F. Supp. 23, 27 (S.D. Ind. 1981) (noting the primacy of the
First Amendment); Dean v. Timpson Indep. Sch. Dist., 486 F. Supp. 302, 304 (E.D. Tex. 1979)
(requiring public school administrators to perform their duties in a manner consistent with the
Constitution). See generally Alexander Meiklejohn, The Reconciliation of First Amendment Freedoms
with Local Control Over the Moral Development of Minors, 12 SUFFOLKU. L. REV. 1205 (1978).
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 ("First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special charac-
teristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students.").
60 See Denno v. Sch. Bd., 959 F. Supp. 1481, 1487 (M.D. Fla. 1997) (finding that the law gov-
erning the constitutionality of forbidding the display of Confederate symbols in a school was
not "clearly established" for purposes of qualified immunity under § 1983).
61 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503.
6 Id. at 505.
6 Id. at 513.
64 See Bruce C. Hafen, Hazelwood School District and the Role of First Amendment Institutions,
1988 DUKE LJ. 685, 689 (1988) (noting that Tinker established a presumption against limiting
student expression).
6 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
Id. at 872 (quoting Barnette v. Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)).
6 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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speech laden with sexual innuendo at an official high school assem-
bly. Separating the dicta from the holding of this opinion is difficult.
Fraser has been interpreted to carve out an exception to the disrup-
tion standard for speech that is inconsistent with school's "basic edu-
cational mission," such as sexual speech,68 but such an interpretation
is belied by Chief Justice Burger's conclusion that the speech was dis-
ruptive. 69 Burger's opinion also rested on the more narrow ground of
the school's power to guard against students' perceptions that the
school was condoning the use of sexual innuendoes at an official
school function. Justice Burger's opinion is long on rhetoric but
short on legal standards. Burger's dictum, "the First Amendment
gives a high school student the classroom right to wear Tinker's arn-
band, but not Cohen's jacket" 70 is unsupported by any articulation of
a legal standard that would supersede the Tinker disruption standard.
The opinion in Fraser is the crux of confusion in the field7' and will be
considered more closely throughout this Comment.
Finally in 1988, the Court ruled in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier that a school was allowed to delete articles from the offi-
cial school newspaper even if the articles would not have been disrup-
tive. The Tinker standard did not apply to such speech, the Court
ruled, because the speaker was putatively the school itself and the
school was entitled to "disassociate itself' from any speech, regardless
of content, whether that speech "is, for example, ungrammatical,
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar
or profane, or unsuitable for immature audiences. 73 The Hazelwood
decision clarified the meaning of Fraser, interpreting the case to rely
on the school-sponsored nature of Fraser's speech,74 but otherwise
did not address the issue of students' right to speak independently.
For example, the Ninth Circuit read Fraser to create an exception to Tinker for "vulgar,
lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech." Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524,
529 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 166 (D. Mass.
1994).
69 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678 ("Some students hooted and yelled; some by gestures graphically
simulated the sexual activities pointedly alluded to in respondent's speech. Other students ap-
peared to be bewildered and embarrassed by the speech. One teacher reported that on the day
following the speech, she found it necessary to forgo a portion of the scheduled class lesson in
order to discuss the speech with the class."). But see Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484
U.S. 260, 271 n.4 (1988) (disclaiming Burger's reliance on the disruption standard).
,0 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682 (referring to Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), where the
Court upheld the right of a man to wear the words "Fuck the Draft" on his ajacket in a court-
house).
71 See Royal C. Gardner, Casenote, Protecting a School's Interest in Value Education to the Detri-
ment of Students'Free Expression Rights: Bethel v. Fraser, 28 B.C. L. REV. 595 (1987) (arguing, be-
fore Hazelwood was decided, that Fraserrequires clarification).
72 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 260.
73 Id. at 271 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
74 Id. at 271 n.4.
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Standing alone, this precedent provides insufficient guidance for
ruling on the kinds of student free speech issues that confront lower
courts. The Supreme Court has not considered a case involving the
issues of Tinker and Fraser combined, such as one involving armbands
bearing sexual innuendoes. Nor has the Court seen a public school
underground student newspaper case,7 or any other combination of
the issues of Tinker and Hazelwood.76 Moreover, the Court has not
heard a case in which students were punished for their out-of-school
activities. Although there is little evidence of circuit split on these is-
sues, it is by no means clear that the Tinker standard should not apply
in full force against censorship of independent sexual speech or un-
derground newspapers.
By trying to use these few cases to determine the outcome of new
issues, lower courts have read more into the Fraser opinion than the
Court intended.77  Their interpretations have disregarded that
Court's efforts in Hazelwood to clarify the relationship between Fraser
and Tinker. There is no direct language in Fraser to support the
proposition that it was changing Tinker. If the Court in Fraser in-
tended to modify Tinker, it might have done so explicitly, or at least
explained the holding of Fraser this way in Hazelwood. Thus, it is by no
means clear that the Court's precedent has recognized any excep-
tions to the right of students to speak independently under the Tinker
standard.
C. The Scope of Relevant Precedent
It is neither necessary nor wise to decide all student free speech
cases through the exegesis of a few opinions. The Court in Tinker
broadly stated the task of constitutional analysis: "First Amendment
Cf Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (striking down a university's censorship
of a campus underground newspaper).
76 As one commentator has pointed out, the interaction between Tinkerand Hazelwood needs
explanation, in order to avoid the absurd result that Tinker's armband would have become
school-sponsored, and thus censorable, if the Des Moines school district decided to celebrate a
holiday like the hypothetical "Vietnam Day." Andrew H. Montroll, Note, Students' Free Speech
Rights, 13 VT. L. REV. 493, 528 (1989).
77 See generally Boroffv. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000) (upholding
right of school to ban Marilyn Manson T-shirts because they contradict school values, citing
Fraser); Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Fraser to uphold a
school's punishment of an elementary school girl for wearing a shirt with the words "racism");
Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist., 978 F.2d 524 (9th Cir. 1992) (upholding school's punish-
ment of students for wearing "SCAB" buttons to show support for the teachers' union, on the
grounds that it was vulgar); Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157 (D. Mass. 1994)
(upholding prohibition on vulgar messages on T-shirts and interpreting Fraser to carve out a
vulgarity exception to Tinker); Broussard v. School Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Va. 1992) (up-
holding a school's censorship of a New Kids on the Block "Drugs Suck" T-shirt on the grounds
that it referred to oral sex, and citing Fraserfor support).
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fights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school en-
vironment, are available to teachers and students."78 Thus, the ability
of the school to limit the speech of students derives from two consid-
erations: First Amendment rights and special characteristics. To de-
termine what First Amendment rights are, one can look to First
Amendment precedent and ask if the state could have prohibited the
expression if it was expressed by an adult in an analogous situation.
If so, then the school may punish or censor the offending student. If
not, then the special characteristics of the school environment can be
considered: are there reasons-unrelated to the suppression of ex-
pression-why the student should be treated differently than an adult
in an analogous situation? If not, then students should benefit from
the same First Amendment rights that adults enjoy. Thus, the ulti-
mate question is not how to reconcile Tinker with Fraser, but simply
how the school environment is different.
Judges often begin their analysis by observing that schools are dif-
ferent, but they merely state the truism and do not inquire into
whether the differences are relevant to the facts of the case.9 The
statement from Fraser that "the constitutional rights of students in
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings," 8r is a fair generalization, but does not logi-
cally imply that school officials are entitled to a presumption that
censorship in school is constitutional. A logical legal analysis consid-
ering "First Amendment rights" and "special characteristics of the
school environment" would search for explicit circumstantial factors
relevant to the issue of the case which prove that students are differ-
ent from adults in such a way that constitutional protections should
be applied to the school in a different light.
Legal precedent other than Tinker and its limited progeny serves
an important function under this analysis. A variety of reasons ex-
plain the differences between the school setting and other settings.
These reasons can be separated into discrete issues, such as the im-
maturity of the hearers and listeners;" the school's special interest in
teaching good manners and inculcating values;"2 the need to elimi-
nate vulgarity;8 and the need to prevent harassment and maintain a
comfortable educational environment. Each of these rationales has
,8 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). See genera llyJames
Cutlip, Note, Symbolic Speech, High School Protest and the First Amendment, 9 J. FAM. L. 119 (1969)
(putting the Tinker decision in context).
19 See, e.g., Boroff 220 F.3d at 468.
80 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
81 See infra notes 86-124 and accompanying text
See infra notes 128-80 and accompanying text.
See infta notes 181-221 and accompanying text.
M See infra notes 2310 and accompanying text.
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been addressed by Court decisions outside of the Tinker line, as well
as inside it. As the following sections will show, in many circum-
stances-in fact, the most serious circumstances-courts do follow
this method.
Analyzing cases in this manner leaves the whole of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence available as a source of authority. Unlike the
process of squeezing meaning out of Justice Burger's Fraser opinion,
this mode of analysis encourages courts to be consistent with the
whole body of First Amendment precedent and gives life to the
Court's demand that the "discretion of the States and local school
boards in matters of education.., be exercised in a manner that
comports with the transcendent imperatives of the First Amend-
ment."85
I. RESTRICTIONS BASED ON THE AGE OF SPEAKERS AND HEARERS
School officials often justify speech prohibitions on the theory
that children, because of their youth and immaturity, suffer special
harm from exposure to some messages.ta Support for such a ration-
ale can be found in Court opinions considering the general constitu-
tional rights of children.87
The Supreme Court has long recognized that "the power of the
state to control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of
its authority over adults."" The state has a legitimate interest in
maintaining the well-being of youth, but such an interest does not
make children second-class rights holders.89 The rights of children
may be abridged only in specific circumstances for specific reasons.
In Bellotti v. BairdY0Justice Burger listed three major rationales for
treating children differently: the special vulnerability of children,
Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982).
86 See, e.g., Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 1994) (involving school
officials' assertion that elementary school students were too young to see the message "Unfair
grades" on another student's T-shirt).
87 For a discussion of the constitutional rights of children, see generally Symposium, Existing
and Emerging Constitutional Rights of Children, 2 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 1 (1999).
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (allowing a state to prohibit children
from proselytizing).
8 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 244-46 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that
children possess fundamental constitutional rights, and that the Court was wrong to allow
Amish parents to forbid their children from attending high school); In reWinship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970) (holding that juvenile delinquents are entitled to due process); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
13 (1967) ("whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
Bill of Rights is for adults alone"); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) ("Neither man nor
child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional requirements
of due process of law.").
90 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (concerning the necessity of informing parents of a minor's choice to
abort a child).
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which could justify restrictions on the speech a student could hear;9'
their lack of "experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize
and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them," which could
justify restrictions on independent student speech;92 and finally, the
importance of parents' guiding role, which justifies the liberty depri-
vations that are natural components of the government's grant of
child custody.93 Any of these rationales might justify stronger speech
prohibitions in school than outside, but the Bellotti rationales are not
limited to the school context; they derive directly from the powers of
the state.
A. The State's Parenting Power
The state's direct control over children, often called the parens pa-
trie power, is highly limited out of deference to the role of parents.
Parents may not abuse their children 9' and must send them to
school,95 but otherwise, the state has no general power to intervene
into the parental relationship to shield children from speech or pre-
vent them from spealdng.96 Thus, when school officials justify speech
prohibitions on the grounds that the children are too young, their
proffered rationale lacks independent force. If the government truly
had independent power to protect young children from speech, it
would be irrelevant whether the speech occurred on or off school
grounds. Yet off school grounds, the state has little power to shield
children. Therefore, if the age of the hearers justifies speech prohi-
bitions, it must do so in combination with other situational factors.
A school's power over children has traditionally been justified by
reference to the doctrine of in loco parentis, under which the state as-
serts some of a parent's arbitrary authority over a child in situations
91 Id. at 634.
92 Id. at 635. Cf Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (allowing state to create a spe-
cial obscenity standard for minors, and to prohibit minors from purchasing "girlie magazines");
Prince 321 U.S. at 158 (allowing state to deem children too young to choose to distribute relig-
ious propaganda).
93 Bellott4 443 U.S. at 637. For example, children do not have the constitutional right to run
away from their parents at will.
94 See generally ROBERTD. GOLDSTEIN, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: CASES AND MATERIALS 56-
59 (1999) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.08) (1985).
See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding that the state may compel chil-
dren to attend school, but may not require them to attend public school).
96 Courts have also upheld statutory "status offenses" like curfews, under which children can
be punished for non-criminal behavior, on the ground that some parents are not able to con-
trol their children. Like dangerous and mentally ill people, children not controlled by rea-
sonably responsible parents are impervious to the deterrents of the criminal law. See generally
Comment, Howard T. Matthews, Jr., Status Offenders: Our Children's Constitutional Rights Versus
What's Right for Them, 27 S.U. L. REV. 201 (2000).
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where the parent is absent.97 While the Court has upheld some state
efforts to aid parents in shielding their children from inappropriate
material, it has placed little stock in the in loco parentis rationale, es-
pecially in recent decades. When speech prohibitions aimed at chil-
dren secondarily impact the freedom of adults, the Court has been
careful to require narrow tailoring. The right of the state to aid par-
ents is therefore limited because the Court has favored the freedom
of adults to receive messages over the need to prevent harm to chil-
dren.
Although the state may do much to aid parents in raising chil-
dren, the power does not derive from a delegation of power by par-
ents to the state. Rather, the state's legitimate interest in the well-
being of children is tempered by the state's deference to parental
prerogatives. School rules cannot logically be justified under the in
loco parentis doctrine unless every parent would apply such a rule to
her child. If a parent allows her daughter to swear, and another par-
ent wants to shield her son from hearing swear words, a rule that
would punish the girl for swearing cannot derive from an in loco pa-
rentis power.9 As the Fifth Circuit held, "it no longer makes sense to
view the school official as the equivalent of a parent.., we view the
school as a special situation .... ,99 Many commentators have agreed
that the in loco parentis doctrine is dead.'0°  Modem courts justify
school power by the need to maintain the educational process, not by
invocation of the idea of in loco parentis. As Justice White wrote in New
Jersey v. T.L.O., "[t]oday's public school officials do not merely exer-
97 The legal roots of the school's parenting powers go all the way back to Blackstone's CoM-
mentaries
[The father] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor
or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a portion of the
power of the parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint and correction, as may
be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed.
1 WILLIAMBLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *441.
8ee Horton v. Goose Creek Ind. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470, 480 n.18 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting
that in loco parentis derives from a parent's treatment of his or herchild).
Id. at 481 n.18. See also Karr v. Schmidt, 320 F. Supp. 728, 734 n.19 (W.D. Tex. 1970)
("[T] he doctrine of in loco parentis has no applicability [here, where] the parents agree with the
child rather than [with] the school.").
100 SeeJohn C. Hogan & Mortimer D. Schwartz, In Loco Parentis in the United States, 1765-
1985, 8 J. LEGAL HISr. 260, 270 (1987) ("In loco parentis is thus no longer a viable concept in
American compulsory public education."); Patrick Dutton, Justifying School Searches: The Problems
with the Doctrine of In Loco Parentis, 8J. JUV. L. 141 (1984) (noting that school searches are no
longer justified under in loco parentis); BrianJackson, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco Parentis: An
Historical Survey and Proposal for Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1135, 1153 (1991) (concluding that in
loco parentis doctrine no longer applies on college campuses, and noting that the doctrine arose
during a time when schools were smaller and more local than they are today). But see Perry A.
Zirkel & Henry F. Reichner, Is the In Loco Parentis Doctrine Dead?, 15 J.L. & EDUC 271, 278-79
(1986) (finding that prior to 1960, the in loco parentis doctrine was accepted in state courts to
justify school rules).
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cise authority voluntarily conferred on them by individual parents;
rather, they act in furtherance of publicly mandated educational and
disciplinary policies."' ' Nor do schools get the power to teach the
curriculum from parents.'ta Schooling and parenting are separate in-
stitutions.
C. Narrow Rules To Shield Children
The Supreme Court has allowed states to pass laws protecting
children from expression, but only if the laws are narrowly tailored."
In Ginsberg v. New York,' 4 the Court upheld a New York law prohibit-
ing the sale of "girlie magazines" to minors, on the ground that stan-
dards for obscenity depend on the age of the viewer. Although the
state would not have had the power to prohibit parents from buying
the magazines for their children, the Court found that the state did
have the power to assist some parents in shielding their children.10r
The Court emphasized that the magazines were not obscene for
viewers over seventeen and thus, the state could not restrict the rights
of the rest of the public to purchase the magzines.0 7 The Court re-
quired narrow tailoring of the state's action. By resting its decision
on obscenity law, the Court required that prohibited material have
no socially redeeming value for minors. Thus, the Ginsberg precedent
does not suggest that states have parental authority to shield minors
from sexual speech in general.
101 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985).
102 Parents may not dictate the boundaries of their children's education. See Keefe v. Geana-
kos, 418 F.2d 359, 361-62 (1st Cir. 1969) ("We do not question the good faith of the defendants
in believing that some parents have been offended. With the greatest of respect to such par-
ents, their sensibilities are not the full measure of what is proper education.").
10 See, e.g., Rowan v. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (upholding federal statute giving mail
recipients the right to refuse unsolicited sexually provocative mail). See generally Meiklejohn,
supra note 58 (showing that obscenity laws grew out of concerns for protecting children).
104 Ginsberg v. NewYork, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
' Id. at 637-43.
106 Id. at 639. See also Doe v. Invin, 428 F. Supp. 1198 (W.D. Mich. 1977) (upholding prohibi-
tions on the selling of contraceptives to minors without parental consent, on the grounds that
parents have a right to raise their children as they please).
107 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 634-35.
108 Id. See also Interstate Circuit v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 689 (1968) ("It is... essential that
legislation aimed at protecting children from allegedly harmful expression-no less than legis-
lation enacted with respect to adults-be clearly drawn and that the standards adopted be rea-
sonably precise so that those who are governed by the law and those that administer it will un-
derstand its meaning and application." (quoting NewYork v. Kahan, 206 N.E.2d 333, 335 (N.Y.
1965) (Fuld, J., concurring))); Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1956) (holding that the
state may not ban a book containing offensive language, even if children might gain access and
be harmed: "Surely this is to burn the house and roast the pig").
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A similar power was later recognized in FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
tion,'09 where the Court upheld the power of a state to prohibit radio
stations from broadcasting swear words except during hours when
children were likely to be asleep."0 The Court found that the free-
dom of adults to hear swear words on the radio was not overly bur-
dened by the requirement that the speech be relegated to late night
air time. Not only was the medium of radio already subject to ex-• • 112 ... 113
tensive regulation, but it was also especially accessible to children.
Thus, a speech prohibition aiming to protect children can be justi-
fied if the medium is already one that the government regulates, and
if the medium is especially accessible to children."
4
In disallowing regulation of content on the Internet, the Court in
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union 5 ruled that the interests of adults
in having easy access to sexually explicit content on the Internet out-
weighed the harm to children of incidental exposure to harmful con-
tent."6
Schools are different from the outside world in that the vast ma-
jority of the hearers of speech are children, who might be harmed by
speech. In applying the immaturity rationale, two questions can be
asked: are the children harmed by the speech, and to what extent
are the rights of mature students impacted? The answers to these
questions suggest that schools may restrict speech extensively in the
early grades in order to protect young children, but that censorship
at the high school level is more problematic.
When considering whether speech harms children, courts usually
defer to the expertise of school administrators and impose a low
standard of proof on the question of whether children are actually
harmed by exposure to vulgar, sexual, or offensive speech. In Fraser,
for example, Chief Justice Burger accepted without question the
rather implausible claim that a speech containing tongue-in-cheek
sexual humor 7 could be "seriously damaging to its less mature audi-
109 438 U.S. 726 (1978). See generally Garvey, supra note 56, at 333-37 (discussing Ginsberg and
Paei/7ca in light of the child's need to grow).
Cf Mailloux v. Kiley, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971) (holding that a rule protecting chil-
dren from "objectionable" language must be predicated on their age and sophistication).
II Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 750 n.28.
1 Id. at 748.
1 Id. at 749.
14 See Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (allowing regulation of nudity in
drive-in movies, on the grounds that children in passing cars might be harmed by momentary
exposure to images of bare bodies).
Is 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
116 Id. at 871-79.
1 Justice Brennan reprinted the speech at issue in his concurrence:
I know a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his character is
firm-but most... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm.
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ence, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the threshold of
awareness of human sexuality.""8 The standard, however, is not so
low as to amount to a presumption."9
When considering the second question, whether the rights of
older students are impacted, courts have found the speech interests
of mature students to weigh heavily in the balance. In the public
elementary school, where the vast majority of the hearers are young,
speech prohibitions do not significantly affect the interests of mature
listeners, and courts have approved speech restrictions in that arena
under low standards. In the high school context, however, students
as old as eighteen rub shoulders with those as young as fourteen.
The principles articulated in Ginsberg, Pacifica, and Reno suggest that
the rights of older students cannot lightly be compromised. In
Trachtman v. Anker,'20 for example, students distributed a sex survey to
high school students in the course of research for a serious journal-
ism project, and the school halted the survey. The Second Circuit
struck down the prohibition as to eleventh and twelfth graders, but
allowed the school to protect ninth and tenth graders. Restrictions to
protect immature students must make way for the rights of mature
students.
Although college students have greater rights than high school
students, 2 - the maturity rationale does not allow states to deny free-
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary, he'll take an is-
sue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts-he drives hard, pushing
and pushing until finally---he succeeds. Jeff is a man who will go to the very end-even
the climax, for each and every one of you.
So vote for Jeff for A. S. B. vice-president-he'll never come between you and the best
our high school can be.
Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 687 (1986).
118 Id. at 683. But see Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 526 (2d Cir. 1977) (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting) ("The picture drawn by the defendants of high school freshmen and sophomores
(to say nothing ofjuniors and seniors) as fragile, budding egos flushed with the delicate rose of
sexual naivety, is so unreal and out of touch with contemporary facts of life as to lead one to
wonder whether there has been a communications breakdown between them and the next gen-
eration.").
119 See Sheck v. Baileyville Sch. Comm., 530 F. Supp. 679, 691 (D. Me. 1982) ("Although a
rational demonstration that harm might result to some students may be possible.., by reason
of their tender age or lack of sophistication or maturity, it is not an acceptable assumption that
all students, regardless of their age or maturity, might be harmed by exposure to such Ian-
guage.").
Trachtman, 563 F.2d at 512.
121 See, e.g., Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 58 (4th Cir. 1971) (noting a potential differ-
ence between free speech rights of secondary school and college students); Brubaker v.
Moelchert, 405 F. Supp. 837 (D.N.C. 1975) (declaring unconstitutionally overbroad a restric-
tion on distribution of underground newspapers at state college); Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F.
Supp. 238, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) ("activities of high school students do not always fall in the same
category as the conduct of college students"). Cf Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp.
157 (D. Mass. 1994) (extending to the high school context a standard of content regulation
that before had only been applied in the university context, as in Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va.,
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dom of expression to all public primary and secondary school stu-
dents. While the First Amendment does not assume that all citizens
have the maturity to exercise their First Amendment rights wisely, as
Justice Fortas wrote in Tinker, "[flreedom of expression would not
truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a be-
nevolent government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots."'2
If public school intends to prepare the young for citizenship,ss it
must respect a student's maturity at some point before he or she is al-
lowed to drop out. The ability to consider ideas in an environment of
free speech is an important component of citizenship that belongs
not merely to the college class. 24
II. RESTRICTIONS BASED ON THE NEED To TEACH BASIC VALUES
A major function of schools, especially in the early grades, is to
teach students the basic rules of polite behavior.125 This function
gives the school a power over children that the state cannot use to
control adults. The school will exercise these powers against students
whose dissent does not cause material disruptions or interfere with
other students' opportunity to learn. The school's need to teach be-
havioral rules is no cause for disregarding Tinker, however, because
basic behavioral lessons are an integral part of the curriculum and
are often necessary for maintaining order. Unfortunately, there is no
bright line between teaching manners and compelling belief, or be-
515 U.S. 819 (1995), where the Court found unconstitutional content regulation in the funding
of student activities, and UWM Post v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis., 774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D.
Wis. 1991), where the court found that a university rule prohibiting discriminatory epithets to-
ward individuals was overbroad and vague).
122 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). But see Seyfried v.
Walton, 668 F.2d 214, 220 (3d Cir. 1981) ("A decision to limit the exposure of young adoles-
cents, who have less developed critical skills, to works such as Mein Kampf which express an ide-
ology that school administrators find abhorrent, should normally remain undisturbed.").
123 SeenAmbach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) ("The importance of public schools in the
preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on
which our society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions."); Brown v. Bd. of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) ("[Education] is the very foundation of good citizenship.").
124 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 385-86 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part)
("The schoolroom is the first opportunity most citizens have to experience the power of the
government. Through it passes every citizen and public official, from schoolteachers to po-
licemen and prison guards. The values they learn there, they take with them in life.").
125 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (finding that schools are "a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him
to adjust normally to his environment"). See generally Noah Webster, On the Education of Youth in
America, in ESSAS ON EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 43, 67 (Frederick Rudolph ed., 1965)
("[In school] children should be taught... the principles of liberty and government. Here the
rough manners of the wilderness should be softened and the principles of virtue and good be-
havior inculcated."); Edward A. Wynne, What Are the Courts Doing to Our Children?, AMER. EDUC,
Jan.-Feb. 1982, at 23,27 (arguing that schools have a function of building community).
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tween innocent twig-bending and full-fledged censorship. The First
Amendment undoubtedly stands in the path of value inculcation;
1 26
the question is where. I argue that the school's power to teach values
does not extend to a power to enforce values when such enforcement
is not necessary to maintain the operation of the school.
A. The Socialization of Children
The school's widely accepted power to socialize children has no
analog in the outside world. Compelling second graders to say
"please" and "thank you" and to refrain from using swear words does
not offend the Constitution, although arresting a man for wearing a
jacket with the words "Fuck the Draft" does. '27 The school may not
indoctrinate belief by forcing a child to recite the Pledge of Alle-
giance,2's but may nevertheless socialize the child, by example and by
subtle signals, into local patterns of speech and behavior, even
though no such patterns are value-free.'2 If education in values is not
part of the official curriculum,' 3° it will take place in a subconscious
"hidden curriculum."'3' However, conceptions of appropriate behav-
ior often are laden with extremely controversial values. '32 At some
point, the interests of the majority of the community in reproducing
their social norms must give way to individual liberty. The point at
which individual liberty becomes paramount might be contingent not
only the age of the speaker but also the nature of the speech. For ex-
ample, it is probably true that a public school may not punish a high
12 See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923) ("That the State may do much, go
very far, indeed, in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally,
is clear, but the individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected."). Seegener-
ally Tyll van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority To Inculcate Youth,
62 TEX. L. REV. 197 (1983).
'2 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
12 Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
19 Schools inevitably teach students what standards of behavior are acceptable in society, see
generally Malcolm Stewart, The Tirst Amendment, The Public Schools, and the Inculcation of Community
Values, 18J.L. & EDUC. 23 (1989) (arguing that value inculcation in schools is inevitable), even
though the standards remain a matter of public debate. The morality taught in Kansas schools
Nill differ from that taught in New York City schools. Constitutional problems arise not because
schools teach morality, but because of the manner in which schools teach morality.
ISO There has been popular movement recently toward putting values into the curriculum.
See generally CAN VIRTUE BE TAUGHT? (Barbara Darling-Smith ed., 1993); DANIEL COLEMAN,
EMOTONALINIELUGENCE (1995).
1 See, e.g., Richard Merelnan, Democratic Politics and the Culture of American Education, 74 AM.
POL SCt. REV. 319, 320 (1980).
1 Melinda Fine points out that the political Left is wary of value education, because they see
it as the inculcation of right-wing values. The Right doesn't like it either, because they see the
Left as inculcating "politically correct values." MELINDA FINE, HABrIS OF MIND: STRUGGLING
OVERVALUES INAbMIEJCA'S CLASSROOMS 171-72 (1995).
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school student for acting gay with the same power it once used to
compel him to share his crayons.
The majority of behavioral rules are constitutional because they
fall under the school's power to maintain the operation of the school
and to teach a curriculum. If children did not learn to share, for ex-
ample, their selfishness would impede many of the activities of early
schooling. Inculcating a respect for authority early in childhood is
essential for ensuring that children do not rebel too much after the
fourth grade. Authority depends as much on psychological power
as on the consequences of rule-breaking. In order to make children
receptive to psychological power, adults have to act arbitrarily some-
times.M The teaching of respect for authority serves not only the
procedural goal of maintaining order in the classroom, but the sub-
stantive goal of teaching children to respect authority in general, in-
cluding parents and police officers as well as teachers. Thus, the
elementary school teacher needs to have broad powers in order to
control behavior and teach the curriculum of the early grades.
As students become young adults, however, this psychological
training must taper off if high school is not to be a military acad-
emy.a5 By the time children become teenagers, they have developed
formal reasoning abilities and are expected to control themselves.1
Under the rubric of the O'Brien test, restrictions on non-disruptive
speech are more likely to "further[] an important or substantial gov-
ernmental interest "' in the early grades, when parents expect teach-
ers to act in loco parentis, rather than in the later grades, when parents
have entrusted their children with greater responsibility. Punishing a
133 Sociologist Eliah Anderson reports that many inner-city school children start to question
the legitimacy of the school around the fourth grade. ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET:
DECENCY, VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CrIY 93 (1999).
134 See David Kirp, Proceduralism and Bureaucracy: Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L.
REV. 841, 856 (1976) (noting that the dissenters in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), stressed
the importance of inculcating adherence to rules).
13 Some troubled high schools might actually function better by emulating the military
academy, but only where strict discipline is necessary to prevent disruption. The behavioral
restrictions I am discussing are restrictions on passive, non-disruptive speech, restrictions that
are prevalent in untroubled high schools where the goal is not the prevention of disruption but
the inculcation of community values. One idea I will not address is the question of whether, in
a troubled high school, a "broken windows" theory of causation could be used to treat passive
speech with bad values as the proximate cause of severe but seemingly unrelated disruptions.
For background on "broken windows" theory, see GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES,
FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING ORDER AND REDUCING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNrIIES
(1996).
13 See HESS & TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL ATIITUDES IN CHILDREN 160 (1968)
("It is apparent from data reported here, as well as from the work of others, that as the child
gets older he sees rules as more flexible and less absolute.").
137 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (requiring that suppression of free
speech further an important or substantial government interest).
us Id.
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young child for "talking back" is more likely "unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression" 9 than the punishment of a teenager for
wearing a "Question Authority" T-shirt. Furthermore, the values on
the agenda of the elementary school are relatively basic, while the
values that a high school principal seeks to instill are often much less
universal, and are more likely to conflict with the values students
learn at home.'40 Restrictions against non-disruptive speech of imma-
ture children whose sole purpose is mischief are more likely to have
merely an "incidental [effect] on alleged First Amendment free-
doms,"'4 ' while in the high school, restrictions are likely to curtail the
speech of individuals with a mature desire to make a point. In the
early grades, where young children are incapable of thinking objec-
tively about values, discipline is usually the only effective mode of
teaching values. In high school, however, where students can think
about and compare the values they receive from school and family,
the classroom is the more appropriate forum for the discussion of
values and a disciplinary speech code is "greater than is essential to
the furtherance of [the] interest"14 of value education. For example,
Mary Beth Tinker might have been kept in from recess by her ele-
mentary school teacher for hurting the feelings of a classmate, but
when she was fourteen, her middle school could not punish her for
wearing an anti-war armband that caused similar emotional distress to
classmates.143
A plurality of the Supreme Court addressed the value-inculcation
rationale in Pico, but gave it little weight:
Petitioners might well defend their claim of absolute discretion in mat-
ters of curriculum by reliance on their duty to inculcate community values.
But we think that petitioners' reliance upon that duty is misplaced where,
as here, they attempt to extend their claim of absolute discretion beyond
the compulsory environment of the classroom, into the school library
and the regime of voluntary inquiry that there holds svay.
4 4
us Id.
10 The values of the elementary school include respect for adults and peers, compassion,
and nonviolence, for example. They are of a different nature than the values the high school
principal seeks to inculcate by, for example, regulating which rap groups students can promote.
Although all values are political, the values of the elementary school are usually less political
than those in the high school, for the simple reason that young children cannot fully under-
stand debates over the Confederate flag or the issues of identity raised by a transgendered stu-
dent's choice of dress. As a result, the motive of value inculcation in the high school is more
likely the suppression of expression.
141 O'BrLn, 391 U.S. at 377.
142 Id.
1 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 518, 524 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (noting that classmates of Mary Beth Tinker had brothers in Vietnam and might
have found the armbands hurtful).
144 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982).
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Pico's rationale suggests that value inculcation is an invalid ration-
ale for the school's interference with a "regime of voluntary in-
quiry"145 like the school library, rather than a "compulsory environ-
ment." Passive, non-disruptive, and non-school-sponsored expression
is another such realm.
B. Punishing as a Means of Teaching
While a second-grade teacher's behavioral lessons are a basic part
of the curriculum, in the high school there is a much sharper distinc-
tion between the curriculum, which consists of academic subjects,
and the disciplinary code, which constrains behavior. Although dis-
cipline and curriculum are one in the early grades, they serve very
different purposes in high school, and their constitutional implica-
tions diverge.
The discipline code might be used not only to maintain order, but
to teach lessons. For example, Justice Burger in Fraser noted with ap-
proval that Matthew Fraser, who gave his monologue as part of a
"school-sponsored educational program in self-government," was
punished in part to teach him the rules of proper public speaking.'4
However, giving him a low grade in the class would also have been ef-
fective. Although rules are effective teachers, they are rarely used to
teach the formal curriculum. Detention and suspension are unusual
repercussions for failure to recite the Gettysburg Address correctly.
The educational process would not seriously be harmed if teachers
were constrained to teach subject matter with grades and maintain
order with the discipline code.
All forms of teaching can be characterized as deprivations of lib-
erty, but normal classroom teaching, employing grade incentives
rather than punishment disincentives, does not interfere with serious
liberty interests of students. If a student plans to become a roofer af-
ter graduation from high school, he might have neither the need nor
the desire to study Shakespeare, but the school may still require him
to take English. This is less of an intrusion on his fundamental liberty
interests than a white-collar work preparatory program, enforced by
discipline, that required him to wear a suit every day, speak obsequi-
ously, and fetch coffee for his teacher. Rules that limit behavior force
students to represent themselves differently than they otherwise
would, whereas normal schoolwork does not force a student to com-
"4 Id.
M Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986).
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promise his identity.' 47 Therefore, there is a constitutional difference
between teaching and punishing.
All subjects might be taught more effectively with the rod,' but
punitive modes of teaching lessons raise significant constitutional
concerns that academic modes do not. Academic teaching falls un-
der the constitutional standards of government speech,149 which are
distinct from the standards of government suppression of speech. If
the First Amendment is to have any meaning within the "schoolhouse
gate," the school's power to control the messages of students cannot
extend to the full limits of its power to speak.*
As Justice Burger disregarded the distinction between teaching
and punishing, his Fraser opinion must be read in light of the absurdi-
ties that would result if the teaching of academic lessons were a suffi-
cient rationale for punitive measures against passive, non-disruptive,
and non-school-sponsored student speech. A teacher may mark
down students who fail to use the "King's English" in class when
asked to do so, but certainly could not punish students for speaking
"Ebonics" to each other in the halls, even though the second method
may be much more effective than the first.i5 It is true that the rights
of students are not coextensive with those of adults in other set-
147 For example, a school does not interfere with the First Amendment by giving a low grade
to a student in a biology class who refuses to answer test questions about the theory of evolu-
tion. The school would, however, violate the Constitution by requiring a student to profess
publicly his belief in evolution, or by punishing a student for announcing in class that the the-
ory of evolution is wrong. See generally Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (dealing with
right to teach evolution); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (same). Of course, a school
can teach the importance of the flag without compelling a flag salute.
148 Students who do not respond to grade incentives would study under threat of incarcera-
tion. Cf Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (upholding the power of the school to use
corporal punishment).
See generally Shiffrin, supra note 41 (analyzing First Amendment constraints on the gov-
ernment's ability to allocate its resources to some messages but not others).
150 Judge Newman of the Second Circuit expressed well the limits of the academic teaching
power in the Pico case, which involved selective purging of a school library:
The plenary power of school officials transgresses First Amendment limits, however,
when their actions tend to suppress ideas. It is one thing to teach, to urge the correct-
ness of a point of view. But it is quite another to take any action that condemns an idea,
that places it beyond the pale of free discussion and scrutiny. Teaching implies that the
strengths and weaknesses of ideas will be closely examined. Some will be favored, others
criticized. This is the academic freedom that has its own strong claim to First Amend-
ment protection .... But the First Amendment does not permit the freedom of the
teacher to become an instrument for suppression of the thoughts of students. Nor may
any school official take action that tends to suppress ideas within the school community.
Pico v. Bd. of Educ. Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist., 638 F.2d 404, 432-33 (2d Cir. 1980);
afl'd, Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
1 Similarly, while the school has the power to teach students that two plus two equals four,
or that human beings evolved, the student retains a fundamental liberty to try to convince his
peers that two plus two equals five, or that God created the earth. See Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that schools may not compel orthodoxy of belief).
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tings, 152 but it is equally true that the power to teach the curriculum is
not coextensive with the power to maintain order.
C. Speech That Interferes with the "Educational Mission"
The government can speak and can express preferences for par-
ticular viewpoints,' 53 but the First Amendment protects people who
dissent from official points of view. The same rule applies to the
school.'54 When student speech undermines the efforts of the school
to promote its messages, such as acceptance of a work ethic or absten-
tion from sex and drugs may the school take action to protect its mes-
sage in ways that the government may not? In 1971, the Second Cir-
cuit interpreted the disruption standard broadly to give schools the
power to "[m]inimize or eliminate influences that would dilute or
disrupt the effectiveness of the educational process as the state con-
ceives it.""" Precedent suggests, however, that the strict Tinker stan-
dard of material disruption governs independent student speech that
contravenes the official school message.
The asserted rationale, that the school has an interest in promot-
ing a message, has arisen in other contexts and been rejected by
courts. In Board of Education v. Barnette, the Supreme Court held,
perhaps too broadly, that "no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion."'l The Court in Pico applied this principle and
found unconstitutional a school's attempts to remove books from its
library on the basis of content.
15 7
In other contexts, the Court has held the State's interest in pro-
moting the public morals through limitations on speech to be virtu-
ally nonexistent.""' In American Communications Association v. Douds,159
ChiefJustice Vinson wrote, " [o]f course we agree that one may not be
imprisoned or executed because he holds particular beliefs."' Next,
in Wieman v. Updegraff,'61 the Court struck down a requirement that
152 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986).
15 See supra note 149.
154 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
exvression at the schoolhouse gate.").
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 807 (2d Cir. 1971).
156 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641-42.
157 Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 869 (1982) (plurality opinion).
158 See generally van Geel, supra note 126, at 254-60 (showing that the Supreme Court has con-
sistently protected adults' freedom of belief).
'M' American Comm. Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
160 Id at 408.
161 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
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teachers take a loyalty oath, 16 in part because the oath would have a
chilling effect on academic freedom.6  In Shelton v. Tucker," the
Court barred schools from even asking teachers about their beliefs.5
The state lacks the power to coerce adults, even mildly, to profess be-
lief.
How can the school have a legitimate interest in promoting val-
ues, when the state has such a limited interest? The Supreme Court
has made a distinction between government speech and government
censorship and has allowed the school to ensure the integrity of its
message, but not to quash dissent from that message. In the Frasei'
and Hazelwood 67 cases, the Supreme Court distinguished between stu-
dent speech that is school-sponsored, and thus outside the realm of
the Tinker disruption standard, and independent student speech that
the school must tolerate.
Justice Burger concluded in Fraser that "[t]he First Amendment
does not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit
a vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent's would undermine the
school's basic educational mission. As this statement has func-
tioned as the source of future court determinations, 19 it deserves
close reading. It is hardly disputable that school officials may "de-
termine" whatever they please; the real question is the extent of their
power, and Burger did not address this question directly. The verb
"determine" does not connote a great extent of power. Burger may
have meant to suggest that school officials are justified in prohibiting
speech whenever they decide that failing to silence the speaker would
"undermine the school's basic educational mission."7 It is important
to read the opinion carefully: it is the school's failure to act, not the
student's act of speech, that does the "undermining." Burger did not
literally say that any speech that might appear to "undermine" the
goals of school administrators is censorable. A simple interpretation,
which reads the "basic educational mission" to refer to the day-to-day
16 Id. at 188-91.
163 Id. at 195 ("Such unwarranted inhibition upon the free spirit of teachers affects not only
those who, like the appellants, are immediately before the Court. It has an unmistakable ten-
dency to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and
practice; it makes for caution and timidity in their associations by potential teachers.").
ICA Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
16 Id. at 485-87.
16 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
16 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
163 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
169 See, e.g., Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1542 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that when the school deems student speech "inconsistent with its basic educational mission," its
actions will be evaluated under a mere reasonableness standard).
N Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.
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operations of the school and "undermine" to refer to material disrup-
tion, makes Burger's statement consistent with Tinker.
Unfortunately, Burger's syntax and choice of words encourage a
more expansive interpretation: that the school may prohibit speech
that challenges the school's basic goals. The word "undermine" sug-
gests to discredit, discourage confidence in, or make less effective.
The phrase, "basic educational mission," suggests the school's over-
arching goal of turning children into mature adults, although it
could be read more narrowly to mean the day-to-day operation of an
institution of learning. Whether the basic educational mission is the
teaching of behavior or the teaching of subjects is not clear. How-
ever, a broad interpretation would eviscerate Tinker. If students can-
not express values contrary to those that administrators would like to
inculcate, their freedom of speech becomes a hollow "right" to say
unobjectionable things. Therefore, if this portion of the Fraser opin-
ion is interpreted as modifying Tinker at all, it could only overrule
Tinker, by allowing the public schools of Des Moines to prohibit anti-
war armbands upon a showing that they would "undermine" the
school's mission of teaching patriotism or respect for the sensibilities
of others.
Later, in Hazelwood, the Court amplified this confusion by inter-
preting Fraser to hold that "[a] school need not tolerate student
speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational mission,' even
though the government could not censor similar speech outside the
school."'7 The Court did not mean to say that independent speech
could be censored at will,1nfor it went on to make a sharp distinction
between school-sponsored and independent speech by students: 'We
conclude that the standard articulated in Tinker for determining
when a school may punish student expression need not also be the
standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name
and resources to the dissemination of student expression."174
The school had a power to disassociate itself "not only from
speech that would 'substantially interfere with [its] work.., or im-
pinge upon the rights of other students,' but also from speech that is,
for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately re-
searched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for
immature audiences. The implication is that vulgarity is not a
171 AMERICANHERITAGEDIGTIONARY875 (3d ed. 1994).
1 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
173 But see Broussard v. Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1535 (E.D. Va. 1992) (citing this portion
of Hazelwood to support a ban on independent student speech).
174 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272-73.
M Id. at 271 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)).
The Court went on clarify when suppression of school-sponsored speech goes too far: "It is only
when the decision to censor a school-sponsored publication, theatrical production, or other
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proper reason for censorship under the Tinker disruption standard.
The Court explicitly placed Matthew Fraser's monologue in the cate-
gory of school-sponsored speech, noting that the monologue was
given at an "official school assembly" and that the school took action
in order "to 'disassociate itself' from the speech in a manner that
would demonstrate to others that such vulgarity is 'wholly inconsis-
tent with the "fundamental values" of public school education."' 176
That the action was taken to "disassociate" indicates that in the con-
text where students might reasonably think the speech is endorsed by
the school, the school may force the speaker to act consistently with
the official values of the school. In all other situations, Hazelwood
says, students "[c]annot be punished merely for expressing their per-
sonal views on the school premises,"1 and the Tinker disruption stan-
dard applies.
The Supreme Court has never considered a case other than Tinker
concerning non-school-sponsored speech. Therefore, when students
do not appear to be speaking for the school, the default disruption
standard of Tinker, unmodified by Fraser or Hazelwoodc' applies.
D. "Vulgar" Speech
Some commentators see a spectrum of categories of speech in
First Amendment law, with Peter Zenger's political tracts at the
high end and Larry Flynt's magazines' at the low end. 3 Polite po-
vehicle of student expression has no valid educational purpose that the First Amendment is so
'directly and sharply implicate[d],' as to require judicial intervention to protect students' con-
stitutional rights." Hazelwood 484 U.S. at 273.
11- Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 26667 (citation omitted).
177 Id. at 266.
13 SeeJohn C. Polifka, Bethel School District v. Fraser: A Legitimate Time, Place, and.Manner
Restriction on Speech in the Public Schools, 32 S.D. L. REV. 156 (1987) (arguing that Fraser's speech
would not have been censored had it been spoken in an arena other than an assembly).
1, See Hafen, supra note 64 at 693-94 (analyzing Hazelwood and arguing that it only applies in
school-sponsored settings, which were not at issue in Tinker).
ISO Some courts, of course, have decided otherwise. See, e.g., Baxter v. Vigo County Sch.
Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 737 (7th Cir. 1994) ("[S]ince Tinker... the Supreme Court has cast some
doubt on the extent to which students retain free speech rights in the school setting.") Such a
claim exaggerates the impact of Fraserand Hazelwood Confusion might stem from a tendency of
judicial clerks to read parenthetical summaries of cases instead of the cases themselves.
181 Peter Zenger was the defendant in a famous pre-Revolutionary free press case in which his
right to criticize government officials was upheld. See generally A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE
AND TRYAL OFJOHN PETER ZENGER, PRINTER OF THE NEWYORKWEELYJOURNAL (Paul Finkel-
man ed., 2000).
18 Larry Flynt published Hustler, a pornographic magazine. See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46 (1988) (upholding the right of Larry Flynt to accuse Faliwell of having sexual inter-
course with his mother in an outhouse).
18 See generally Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34
VAND. L REV. 265, 282-83 (1981) (arguing that categorization in First Amendment theory is
inevitable). But see SHIFERIN, supra note 40, at 44 ("To say that government cannot suppress
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litical speech tends to receive greater protection than impolite
speech that contains little political content. The Court has drawn
such a distinction both outside of the school context, to help justify
confining George Carlin to late night airtime in FCC v. Pacifica Foun-
dation,' and inside the school context, to uphold the punishment of
a student for using sexual innuendo in a speech at a school assembly
in Fraser.5
Although there is overwhelming precedent that adults have sub-
stantial rights to low-value speech and expression, 18 courts have been
reluctant, in part because of the Fraser decision,'8 to acknowledge
that these rights belong also to students. Indeed, many have used
Fraser to invent a special category of low-value student speech, 5 with
speech unless the speech is of low value sounds like a parody of free speech theory. The censor
will always be inclined to say that the speech suppressed is of low value."); Schauer, supra note
183, at 294-95 (arguing that a subcategory based on offensiveness would be too vague); Robert
Wolff, Pacifica's Seven Dirty Words: A Sliding Scale of the First Amendment, 1979 U. ILL. LAW F. 969
(1979) (arguing that a sliding scale is inconsistent with precedent and First Amendment the-
irA FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978):
In this case it is undisputed that the content of Pacifica's broadcast was "vulgar," "offen-
sive," and "shocking." Because content of that character is not entitled to absolute con-
stitutional protection under all circumstances, we must consider its context in order to
determine whether the Commission's action was constitutionally permissible.
Id. at 747-48.
18 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986) ("This Court's First Amendment ju-
risprudence has acknowledged limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the speaker in
reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexually explicit.").
186 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("For, while the particular four-letter
word being litigated here is perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is never-
theless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."); Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v.
Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959) ("And in the realm of ideas it protects expression which is
eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing."). See also Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495,
501 (1952) ("The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened
by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform."); Winters v. New York, 333
U.S. 507, 510 (1948) ("The line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for
the protection of that basic right .... What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doc-
trine.");Janetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334, 1337 n.5 (4th Cir. 1974) ("The First Amendment is not
limited in its protection to issues of great societal and political impact."); Iota Xi Chapter v.
George Mason Univ., 773 F. Supp. 792, 793 (E.D. Va. 1991) ("One of the fundamental rights
secured by the First Amendment is that of free, uncensored expression, even on matters some
may think are trivial, vulgar or profane.") (citing Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 992, 1000 (4th
Cir. 1985)); Stanton v. Brunswick, 577 F. Supp. 1560, 1567-68 (D. Me. 1984) (protecting a mere
quotation in a yearbook). But see Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment,
25 WM. & MARYL. REV. 189 (1983) (arguing that the government should be able to discrimi-
nate against speech of low value).
187 See, e.g., W. David Watkins & John S. Hooks, The Legal Aspects of School Violence: Balancing
School Safety with Students' Rights, 69 MISS. L.J. 641, 670 (1999) ("Fraser illustrates the deference
the Court is willing to give school administrators in proscribing student speech that is not con-
sidered purely political.").
188 See, e.g., Chandler v. McMinnville Sch. Dist, 978 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1992) (creating a
category of "vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly offensive speech"); Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm.,
861 F. Supp. 157, 166 (D. Mass. 1994) (following Chandler); Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of
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descriptors lifted from Fraser including "obscene,"', "lewd,"' 9 ° "vul-
gar,"19. and "plainly offensive." 12 Judge Alito of the Third Circuit has
stated explicitly that "[i]n the public schools, low-value speech, such
as vulgar and offensive language, may be restricted to a greater extent
than would otherwise be permissible."' 93
People of all ages have extensive rights outside of school to use
foul language and present themselves as they wish. 9 Regulating the
manner in which an expression is made can be just as unconstitu-
tional as regulating the message, as the Supreme Court held in Cohen
v. California.195 There, the Court invalidated a California statute that
prohibited the use of "vulgar, profane, or indecent language within
the presence or hearing of women or children, in a loud and boister-
ous manner,"t which California had used to punish a man for wear-
ing ajacket emblazoned with the words "Fuck the Draft."'9' 7 Although
the vulgarity was "inconsequential"19 it was constitutionally pro-
tected."6' In Hess v. Indiana, the Court even upheld the right to yell
the word "fuck" in public.2°1
The Supreme Court has implied that these rights do not auto-
matically extend to students in school. In Fraser, Justice Burger
noted, "[a]s cogently expressed by Judge Newman [of the Second
Circuit], 'the First Amendment gives a high school student the class-
room right to wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket."''
Neither Justice Burger nor Judge Newman gave any support from
Educ., 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000) ("vulgar or plainly offensive speech"); Killion v. Franklin
Regional Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 453 (W.D. Pa. 2001) (holding that school may "cate-
gorically prohibit lewd, vulgar or profane language on school property").
189 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.
190 Id.
191 Id. at 682.
1'M Id. at 683.
19 C.H. ex relZ.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 211 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito,J., dissenting).
194 See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 250 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("An indi-
vidual's personal appearance may reflect, sustain, and nourish his personality and may well be
used as a means of expressing his attitude and lifestyle.").
19 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
19 Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16 n.1.
197 Id. at 16.
19 Id. at 15.
1I9 The Court in Cohen suggested, however, that if the statute had been more narrowly drawn
to protect the "decorous atmosphere" of the courtroom, it might have been constitutional. Id.
at 19.
2W Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973).
201 Id. at 107 (overturning conviction of an anti-war protester who was arrested for disorderly
conduct after a sheriff heard him say: "We'll take the fucking street later").
M Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682-83 (1986) (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ.
Granville Cent. Sch. Dis., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979)).
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precedent to support the conclusion.23 Justice Brennan, in his con-
currence, noted that " [i]f respondent had given the same speech out-
side of the school environment, he could not have been penalized
simply because29overnment officials considered his language to be
inappropriate."
Justice Burger also suggested in Fraser that a balancing test limits
students' freedom to engage in low-value speech. He wrote, "[t]he
undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in
schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's coun-
tervailing interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially ap-
propriate behavior."2°5 This statement is a mere truism, however, not
a change in the law.2 First Amendment analysis often entails balanc-
ing interests. The weight assigned to each side in the balance is the
legal question, not the mere identification of the things to be bal-
anced. Nowhere in the Fraser or Hazelwood opinions did the Court
lower the level of scrutiny established by Tinker. 07
The notion that unpopular views can always be expressed in a so-
cially appropriate manner is alien to general First Amendment law.
Speakers of unpopular opinions do not have equal access to the mar-
ketplace of expression,2w and sometimes have to speak loudly in or-
der to be heard. For that reason, the law recognizes the inseparabil-
ity of the medium from the message.209 While the First Amendment
protects the ability of adults to challenge society's notion of what is
socially appropriate, Fraser suggests that the school's interest in teach-
ing "socially appropriate behavior"210 justifies derogation of First
Amendment rights. If that were true, it would raise a serious dan-
Justice Burger orJudge Newman might have pointed to the fact thatJustice Harlan, who
wrote Cohen, dissented in Tinker. Justice Harlan did not disapprove of Tinker's constitutional
analysis, however; he even cited Tinker in Cohen. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 23. Harlan merely ex-
pressed the view that school officials ought to have absolute power to act in good faith.
204 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 688.
D5 Id. at 681.
206 But see Broussard v. Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1535 (E.D. Va. 1992) (interpreting Fraser
as "enunciating" a new balancing test).
M Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (holding that stu-
dents "are possessed of fundamental rights which the State must respect," and rejecting a stan-
dard of mere reasonableness).
Incidentally, some have suggested that the First Amendment is applicable only where
there is a true "marketplace of ideas," and that the school is not such a forum. See Goldstein,
supra note 37, at 1343. However, this view is entirely inconsistent with Tinker, where the Court
recognized the school's role as a forum for controversy. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("[Wlords are often chosen as much
for their emotive effect as their cognitive force.").
210 Id.
211 Some courts have interpreted Fraser this way. See, e.g., Muller v.Jefferson Lighthouse Sch.,
98 F.3d 1530, 1536 (7th Cir. 1996) (interpreting Fraser to endorse an inculcative vision of public
education that would allow suppression of socially inappropriate behavior); Hooks, supra note
187, at 671 (interpreting Fraser to allow prohibition of "offensively lewd and indecent" speech).
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ger that state officials, instead of maintaining a forum in which norms
may safely be challenged, would instead enter that forum wielding
state power in order to punish dissenters for promoting unofficial
ideas.
The normative policies that motivate the narrow construction of
"manner" regulations are particularly prevalent in the school. The
notion that manner regulations are content-neutral rings especially
untrue in the school. For example, a transgendered boy could ex-
press his view that cross-dressing is acceptable merely by writing a let-
ter to the local newspaper, but his message would have little effect. If
he came to school dressed as a girl, his message could not be ignored.
This manner of expression, however effective, would be considered
socially inappropriate, and school officials might try to teach him "the
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior 212 by punishing him.
Meanwhile, the popular view that people should stay within their
gender role enjoys powerful expression every day in school, as every-
one comes dressed in clothing designed for their gender. The con-
tent, manner, and performative aspect of speech are inseparable.
The Tinker Court understood that stating an unpopular opinion is
never polite. The anti-war armbands might have offended many stu-
dents and teachers. The school had a legitimate interest in teaching
that a math class is not an appropriate forum for a student to attempt
to change his classmates' attitudes about the Vietnam War. Justice
Black, writing in dissent, correctly noted that the armbands "took the
students' minds off their classwork and diverted them to thoughts
about the highly emotional subject of the Vietnam war. 213 Yet, de-
spite this gravely inconsiderate behavior, the Court prohibited the
school from acting. In comparison, nondisruptive vulgar speech
causes relatively slight disrespect for sensibilities.
There are few reasons why schools are special in ways that would
justify a different standard for restricting the manner of speech. In
212 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
213 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 518.
214 This discrepancy was particularly evident in the case of Pyle v. School Committee, where the
district court cited Fraser in deciding that vulgar expressions could be prohibited, while citing
Tinker in concluding correctly that non-vulgar expressions must be allowed "even when the ex-
pression of these ideas may result in hurt feelings or a sense of being harassed." Pyle v. S.
Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 159 (D. Mass. 1994).
The notion that vulgarities violate sensibilities arises from the outdated notion that women
are expected to blush at the mention of a four-letter word. See generally NOEL PERRIN, DR.
BOWDILER'S LEGACY, A HISFORY OF EXPURGATED BOOKS IN ENGIAND AND AMERICA (1969). In-
deed, the statute at issue in Cohen created an exception for the speaking of vulgarities among
men. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16 n.1. Although schools have a legitimate interest in teaching stu-
dents to speak formally, courts must acknowledge no child has ever had to enter therapy be-
cause of premature exposure to vulgar language. See Garvey, supra note 56, at 321.
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215Broussard,, for example, a district court upheld the punishment of a
seventh grade student for wearing a New Kids on the Block T-shirt
bearing the words "Drugs Suck! " in large letters.1 6 The court ap-
proved the school's action on the grounds that the Tinker standard
applies only when the message of the speech was targeted, while the
prohibition of the "Drugs Suck" shirt targeted the mode but not the
217message. Having disposed of the Tinker standard, the court found
the censorship to be a "permissible decision by the school to regulate
middle school children's language and channel their expression intoso ially " 18
socially appropriate speech." 18 The court offered no rationale as to
why manner restrictions are different inside the school than outside
219the school, except to note that the students were young, and that
"[t]eachers and administrators must have the authority to do what
they reasonably believe is in the best interest of their educational re-
sponsibilities, as we cannot abandon our schools to the whims or pro-
clivities of children." However, the Court in Tinker rejected just
such a reasonableness standard.2 l The chief rationale for treating re-
strictions on "low value" speech in schools differently goes unstated:
students' free speech rights are considered by many to have low
value.
III. RESTRICTIONS FOR MAINTAINING A COMFORTABLE LEARNING
ENVIRONMENT
The need to maintain order justifies many restrictions on student
speech, but many school officials seek to extend their power beyond
the disruption standard for the purpose of creating a more comfort-
able learning environment. 222 There are some ways in which the
school is different from the outside world that are relevant to the
constitutionality of banning speech that makes some groups feel un-
215 Broussard v. Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526 (E.D. Va. 1992).
216 Id. at 1527. The Court relied on the dicta in Fraser regarding balancing and undermining
the basic educational mission. Id. at 1535. See supra notes 2055, 153-72 and accompanying text.
217 Id. at 1535 ("It seems clear that, when schools seek to regulate the form of the message
rather than the message, they may do so."). The court rejected the testimony of students and
etymologists that middle schoolers would not have interpreted such a message to refer to oral
sex, as the adult administration thought. Id. at 1534, 1537.
218 Id. at 1537.
219 Id.
2MId.
22 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969) (providing for a
standard of review based on substantial disruption, replacing a former standard that required
mere reasonableness).
See, e.g., Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001) (striking down a
"harassment" policy on the grounds that it interfered with plaintiff's right to challenge homo-
sexuality as a sin).
[Vol. 4:3
SPEECf IVIPUBLIC SCHOOLS
comfortable.23 Restrictive rules may operate as prophylactic reme-
dies against racial and sexual harassment and other offensive speech,
thereby maximizing every student's ability to learn. However, the
Supreme Court in Tinker recognized that free speech will inevitably
make some people uncomfortable,224 but it must be tolerated, even at
the expense of teachers' peace of mind.225 Following Tinker, lower
courts have consistently applied the stringent disruption standard to
school officials' well-meaning attempts to make the learning envi-
ronment more comfortable by restricting student speech.
The justifications for comfort-raising speech restrictions fall into
four main categories: preventing disturbance, including fights and
school shootings;226 prohibiting harassment based on sex, race, or
other characteristics; guarding against racial conflict;m and protect-
ing the ability of the "captive audience" of students to learn.m To
further these goals, school administrators have instituted speech
codes, dress codes, and prophylactic harassment policies and when
they are challenged plaintiffs often win, because courts have refused
to make exceptions to the Tinker disruption standard.
A. Preventing Disturbance
The need to prevent disturbance and injury is certainly a compel-
ling reason to limit speech.a ° Limitations on gang clothing, for ex-
ample, may be justified in the interest of public safety.231 The starting
point of First Amendment analysis, however, was laid out in Whitney v.
California: "there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil
will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable
See generally Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601, 325 (1990) (con-
cluding that the question of whether racist speech should be regulated in the school setting is
different from the question whether it should be regulated in public discourse).
24 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 ("In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that
ahys accompany an unpopular viewpoint.").
Z5 Id. at 508.
See infra notes 230-44.
2n See infra notes 245-86.
See infra notes 287-97.
See infra notes 298-310.
See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507 (holding that disruptive speech can be prohibited); Blackwell v.
Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966) (upholding a ban on "freedom
buttons" because they created a disturbance).
231 SeeJeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459, 1461-62 (G.D. Cal. 1993)
(holding that schools can ban gang clothing if and only if they can show a gang presence). See
generally Hooks, supra note 187, at 671 (discussing the use of dress codes to prevent gang-related
disruptions).
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ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.
' '3
Such a standard is high. How is the school different? The Court ad-
dressed the question in Tinker
[I] n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression. Any depar-
ture from absolute regimentation may cause trouble. Any variation from
the majority's opinion may inspire fear. Any word spoken, in class, in the
lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another
person may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitu-
tion says we must take this risk, and our history says that it is this sort of
hazardous freedom-this kind of openness--that is the basis of our na-
tional strength and of the independence and vigor of Americans who
grow up and live in this relatively permissive, often disputatious, soci-
ety.
Thus, if school administrators feel that an unpopular message
might cause a disturbance, they may not act if the probability of dis-
turbance is minute or if the magnitude of the disturbance is negligi-
ble. There must be "facts which might reasonably [lead] school
authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interfer-
ence with school activities."' m
If school administrators can point to an actual disruption, and not
just a disruption of their peace of mind, then courts will defer to their
judgment.2 Courts have been skeptical, however, of schools' at-
tempts to call the natural effect of pure free speech a material disrup-
tion. In Sullivan v. Houston, for example, a vice-principal expelled
students for writing an underground newspaper, offering as evidence
of disruption that there were "some students gathered together and
they had something on their minds that concerned them," and that
his colleagues observed a "change in attitude. '' 37  The court con-
cluded that the alleged disruption was a pretense for expelling the
students for criticizing authority.2 Judges should inquire whether
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927). The school environment is more orderly
than a street, and therefore school officials may prevent disruptions that the police would nor-
mally have to tolerate. Yet there is no reason to apply a lesser standard of imminence in
schools. But see Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54, 58 (4th Cir. 1971) ("[I]f there are substantial
facts which reasonably support a forecast of likely disruption, the judgment of the school
authorities in denying permission and in exercising restraint will normally be sustained.").
M Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09 (citations omitted). See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 23,
(1971) (rejecting the argument that censorship should be used to protect the speaker from in-
jury that he might suffer at the hands of angry listeners).
2M Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
M See, e.g., Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 117-18 (1972) (finding picketing outside of a
school disruptive).
Sullivan v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 307 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Tex. 1973), vacated on other
grounds, 475 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 1355.
MId.
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student speech merely causes other students to be offended, or actu-
ally impairs the ability of other students to learn.29
The widely-publicized school shootings of the late 1990s, includ-
ing the tragedy at Columbine High School,24° spawned many efforts in
schools to prevent violence before it starts. 241 Such efforts, even when
reasonable, will certainly result in school officials taking action
against students who are not in fact potential killers. 242 However, the
important interest in preventing school shootings does not release
school officials from their obligation to respect free speech. "Zero
tolerance" policies against threatening speech are inconsistent with
Tinker's "hazardous freedom" requirement.243 Even after the Colum-
bine massacre, the Ninth Circuit adhered to Tinker in a case involving
the expulsion of a student who showed his teacher a poem he wrote
about shooting his classmates and himself- "In applying Tinker, we
look to the totality of all the relevant facts... confronting the school
officials that might reasonably portend disruption."2 4 Thus, even a
heightened sense of alert does not warrant the carving out of excep-
tions to Tinker.
B. Preventing Harassment
Schools are different in part because compulsory attendance
means that students do not always have the choice of walking away
when someone harasses them. Schools have followed workplaces and
instituted harassment policies.24 5 School officials sometimes go fur-
ther and pass prophylactic speech codes for the purpose of prevent-
ing harassment that they consider discriminatory according to gen-
der, race, religion, or (in some places) sexual orientation; but there is
a fine line between a harassment code and a speech code.
The school is not exempted from sexual harassment law. The
school may be held liable for failing to eliminate hostile environ-
See generally Alison G. Myhra, Note, The Hate Speech Conundrum and the Public Schools, 68
N.D. L. REV. 71 (1992).
240 See generally WENDYMURRAY ZOBA, DAY OF RECKONING: COLUMBINE AND THE SEARCH FOR
AMERICA'S SOUL (2000).
241 See generally Barnes, supra note 36; Ramey, supra note 36.
242 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, for example, recently found unconstitutional an eighth
grade boy's year-long suspension for writing a story about decapitating a teacher. In re Douglas
D., 626 N.W.2d 725 (Wis. 2001).
243 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
244 LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th Cir. 2001).
245 See generally Elizabeth J. Gant, Applying Title Vii "Hostile Work Environment" Analysis to Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972-An Avenue of Relieffor Victims of Student-to-Student Sexual
Harassment in the Schools, 98 DICK. L. REV. 489 (1994); Kay P. Kindred, When Equal Opportunity
Meets Freedom of Expression: Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment in Schoo
75 N.D. L. REV. 205 (1999) (arguing that officials must balance the First Amendment with the
need to prevent sexual harassment in public schools).
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ments created by student or teacher behavior.2  Because rules
against fighting in school may be stricter than the criminal code,
schools might reasonably prohibit the use of "fighting words" di-
rected at particular students. However, the Court in Cohen247 declined
to apply the Chaplinsky "fighting words" exception to the First
Amendment!0 because the word "fuck" was not directed at any one
person. In addition, courts have recognized extensive power to
prohibit racially insensitive school-sponsored25 1 speech. 2  The need
to prevent harassment does not release school officials from their
First Amendment duties. The definition of harassment does not take
on an expansive scope in the school context.m Administrators may
not use harassment restrictions as a pretense for banning all messages
that might be offensive to someone.? 4 Nor may school officials, for
example, prevent harassment of gay students by forbidding the wear-
ing of pink triangles, or by forbidding other students from expressing
disapproval of homosexuality?'5
Anti-harassment codes at universities often fail for reasons of
overbreadth, vagueness," and viewpoint discrimination. In Dambrot
2M See generally Gant, supra note 245.
247 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
248 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (recognizing a "fighting words"
exception to the First Amendment).
249 Id. Cf Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 520 (2d Cir. 1977) ("a blow to the psyche may
do more permanent damage than a blow to the chin" (Gurfein,J., concurring)).
25 See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 20 ("No individual actually or likely to be present could reasonably
have regarded the words on appellant'sjacket as a direct personal insult.").
251 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (allowing broad regulation of
school-sponsored, as opposed to independent, student speech).
252 See Augustus v. Sch. Bd., 507 F.2d 152, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that public school
could bar use of Confederate flag as school symbol and use of name "Rebels" for athletic teams
because of racial tension and potential disruption); Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332, 1335 (6th
Cir. 1972) (holding that schools could prohibit use of the Confederate flag as school flag, "Re-
bels" as team name, and "Dixie" as school pep song).
M Those who have pushed the limit have failed. In Monteiro v. Tempe Union High School Dis-
trict, 158 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1998), for example, an African-American student charged that the
school curriculum's use of Mark Twain's Hucklebeny Finn and William Faulkner's A Rose for Emily
created a hostile racial environment under Tide VI because the works contained "repeated use
of the profane, insulting and racially derogatory term 'nigger.'" Id. at 1024. The Ninth Circuit
held that the assignment of the books was not discriminatory conduct. Id. at 1035.
2M See Klink v. Ramsey County, 397 N.W.2d 894 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that foul
language and vulgar behavior do not automatically constitute sexual harassment of a person
who finds the language or conduct offensive). See also Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d
428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that Tide VII was "not designed to purge the workplace of
vulgarity").
2 5 See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001) (involving effort by self-
identified Christians to strike down a harassment code that chilled their liberty to express their
view that homosexuality is a sin).
On the First Amendment doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth, see generally
Anthony Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L REV.
67 (1960); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (discussing overbreadth).
[Vol. 4:3
SPEECHIN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
v. Central Michigan University,257 the court struck down a speech code
that attempted to ban the use of racial epithets2 on the grounds that
it constituted viewpoint discrimination because it targeted speech
with "negative" racial "connotations,"9 but allowed speech with posi-
tive racial connotations. The court also found the code unconstitu-
tionally vague because it relied on subjective terms including "offen-
sive" and "negative" and thus failed to give "fair notice of the
standard of conduct to which a citizen is held accountable." 260 The
court relied upon R.A.V. v. City of St. Pau 61 without distinguishing
the non-educational context of that case.262 Many other public uni-
versity speech codes have fallen to judicial scrutiny.2 63
Interestingly, court opinions considering the constitutionality of
university speech policies have cited freely from First Amendment
cases outside of the educational context.2  When they have distin-
guished the educational environment, they have done so to empha-
size the importance of the First Amendment,26 not to de-emphasize
27 Dambrot v. Central Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
The code prohibited:
any intentional, unintentional, physical, verbal, or nonverbal behavior that subjects an
individual to an intimidating, hostile or offensive educational, employment, or living en-
vironment by (c) demeaning or slurring individuals through... written literature be-
cause of their racial or ethnic affiliation; or (d) using symbols, epitaphs [sic) or slogans
that infer negative connotations about an individual's racial or ethnic affiliation.
Id. at 481.
25 Id.
Id. at 484 (quoting Leonardson v. City of East Lansing, 896 F.2d 190 (6th Cir. 1990)).
211 RA.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down a city ordinance that prohib-
ited the display of racially offensive symbols as viewpoint discrimination).
SeeDambro 839 F. Supp. at 483.
See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (finding that denying funds to
Christian student newspaper was tantamount to viewpoint discrimination where money came
from general student fund); Papish v. Bd. of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (finding the distri-
bution of provocative cartoons, including one with the words "motherfucker acquitted" consti-
tutionally protected); Iota Xi Chapter v. George Mason Univ., 773 F. Supp. 792, 793 (E.D. Va.
1991) (holding that fraternity members who dressed up as "ugly women" could not be punished
because "a state university may not hinder the exercise of First Amendment rights simply be-
cause it feels that exposure to a given group's ideas may be somehow harmful to certain stu-
dents"), affd, 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993); UWM Post v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis.,
774 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (holding that a rule prohibiting students from directing dis-
criminatory epithets with intent to demean them and create a hostile educational environment
was vague and overbroad because it covered situations when there would be no breach of
peace); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 731 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (holding that university
could not "proscribe speech simply because it was found to be offensive, even gravely so, by
large numbers of people" by prohibiting "stigmatizing or victimizing" individuals on the basis of
rac2 ethnicity, religion, and other characteristics).
See, e.g., Doe, 731 F. Supp. at 863; Dambro4 839 F. Supp. at 481-85.
See, &g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 15 ("For the University, by regulation, to cast disapproval
on particular viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free speech and creative inquiry
in one of the vital centers for the nation's intellectual life, its college and university cam-
puses."); Doe 731 F. Supp. at 863 ("These principles acquire a special significance in the univer-
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it, as cases involving high school students following Fraser have
done.266 Justice Burger's dissent in Papish v. Board of Curators of the
University of Missouri is one of the only sources for the notion that the
state's interest in education warrants diminishment of First Amend-
ment rights in the university environment. There, he claimed that "a
university is not merely an arena for the discussion of ideas by stu-
dents and faculty; it is also an institution where individuals learn to
express themselves in acceptable, civil terms."267 Thus, in the univer-
sity realm, First Amendment protections against vague or content-
based speech regulation apply in full force, even though the state's
interests in preventing harassment and teaching respectful behavior
are strong.
These protections have been extended to secondary school stu-
dents. In Pyle v. School Committee, in which I was a plaintiff, one clause
of the school district's dress code forbade clothing that "[h]arasses,
threatens, intimidates or demeans an individual or group of indi-
viduals because of sex, color, race, religion, handicap, national origin
or sexual orientation. ,268 The court struck down the clause, reasoning
that " [w] hile a school can bar a T-shirt that causes a material disrup-
tion, it cannot prohibit one that merely advocates a particular point
of view and arouses the hostility of a person with an opposite opin-
ion."'s The court considered precedent from outside the secondary
school context, including RKA.V v. City of St. Paul,270 which struck
down an ordinance against cross burning, and Iota Xi v. George Mason
University,71 which overturned a university's punishment of fraternity
members for holding an "ugly woman contest." These two cases
stand for the proposition that public disapproval of a viewpoint is in-
sufficient grounds for its selective suppression.2
In applying these cases to the facts, the Pyle court noted that the
"harassment" clause had been used to prohibit T-shirts like "Co-Ed
Naked Band: Do It To the Rhythm," a shirt with a "questionable" po-
tential to harass.2 While the clause would undoubtedly apply to a
sity setting, where the free and unfettered interplay of competing views is essential to the insti-
tution's education mission.").
See, e.g., Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 2000) (com-
mencing First Amendment analysis by noting the diminishment of the First Amendment in the
educational context); Broussard v. Sch. Bd., 801 F. Supp. 1526, 1536 (E.D. Va. 1992) (same).
Papish, 410 U.S. at 672 (BurgerJ., dissenting).
26 Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 163 (D. Mass. 1994).
20 Id. at 171.
I RAV. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
27 Iota Xi Chapter v. George Mason Univ., 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993).
2n The judge also cited Dambrot v. Central Michigan University, 839 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Mich.
1993), a university speech code case. Pyle, 861 F. Supp. at 172.
Id. at 172.
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shirt objecting to homosexuality,274 it had not in fact been used
against a shirt showing two men kissing and the caption "Read My
Lips." Thus, although the school should act diligently to prevent
harassment,2 it goes too far when it regulates speech on the basis of
its content rather than its actual or imminent disruptive effect.2n The
court echoed TinkeP in pointing out the sacrifices a school must
make to comply with the First Amendment:
The First Amendment does not permit official repression or homogeni-
zation of ideas, even odious ideas, and even when the expression of these
ideas may result in hurt feelings or a sense of being harassed. A school
committee may not ban sech other than that reflecting the dominant
or most comforting ethos.'
The rationale for striking down the anti-harassment clause was, there-
fore, firmly planted in larger First Amendment doctrine, and no con-
cessions were made on grounds of students' maturity or the school's
interest in using the discipline code as a teaching tool.
More recently, the Third Circuit invalidated a harassment code in
Saxe v. State College Area School District.2 Motivated by the assumption
that "[d]isrespect among members of the school community is unac-
ceptable behavior which threatens to disrupt the school environment
and well being of the individual,"21 the code prohibited all harass-
ment, which it defined as:
[V] erbal or physical conduct based on one's actual or perceived race, re-
ligion, color, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, disability, or
other personal characteristics, and which has the purpose or effect of
27 The superintendent testified to this effect at trial. At trial he also distinguished between
two hypothetical shirts, "Use a condom every time" and "Condoms save lives." He would have
allowed the latter, but banned the former, on the grounds that it encouraged sexual inter-
course. No clause in the dress code prohibited the encouragement of sex; the superintendent
was rather indicating his desire to use power over student clothing in order to pick and choose
the viewpoints he would permit to be heard in his schools.
Z Ple, 861 F. Supp. at 172.
Z76 Indeed, the court had earlier denied a temporary restraining order against the dress code,
deferring to the expertise of school administrators in preventing sexual harassment and alleviat-
ing the "confusion suffered by high school age students at the constant bombardment of often
inconsistent sexual messages." Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 824 F. Supp. 7, 11 (D. Mass.
1993).
Pye 861 F. Supp. at 171.
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) ("Any word spo-
ken, in class, in the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another per-
son may start an argument or cause a disturbance. But our Constitution says we must take this
risk.-).
2 Pyle, 861 F. Supp. at 159.
2W Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001).
23 I& at 202.
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substantially interfering with a student's educational performance or cre-
ating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment.2
Plaintiffs were Christians who claimed a right to speak out against
homosexuality. The district court held against the plaintiffs, reason-
ing that "harassment" is not entitled to First Amendment protection.
The Third Circuit reversed, holding that there "is no categorical
'harassment exception' to the First Amendment's free speech clause,"
and that the harassment policy prohibited "a substantial amount of
speech that would not constitute actionable harassment under either
federal or state law." Although agreeing that discriminatory con-
duct is not protected by the First Amendment, the court cited R.A. V.
v. City of St. Paul and held that "' [h] arassing' or discriminatory
speech, although evil and offensive, may be used to communicate
ideas or emotions that nevertheless implicate First Amendment pro-
tections."24 The emotive impact of speech, the court held, is not a
"secondary effect" that can be regulated under a lesser standard.20
Looking finally to the Tinker-Fraser-Hazelwood line of cases, the court
concluded that when speech is non-vulgar, even if it is "'derogatory'
speech about such contentious issues as 'racial customs,' 'religious
traditions,' 'language,' 'sexual orientation,' and 'values,"' the speech
"is within a student's First Amendment rights" when it "does not pose
a realistic threat of substantial disruption."26
Thus, in university cases and in recent cases like Pyle and Saxe,
courts recognize no exception to the Tinker disruption standard when
reviewing efforts of secondary schools to prohibit harassing speech.
C. Preventing Racial Conflict
Some schools may experience racial tensions when, for example,
students display the Confederate flag on their clothing. Although
students can engage in healthy debate on the question of whether the
battle flag of the Confederacy indicates racial hatred or regional
pride, arguments might occasionally escalate into physical confronta-
tion.
Several courts have upheld the prohibition of the Confederate
flag on safety grounds. In the early case of Melton v. Young, for ex-ample, the court held the school could punish students for wearing
The code further provided that harassing conduct "can include any unwelcome verbal,
written or physical conduct which offends, denigrates or belittles an individual because of any
of the characteristics described above." Id.
W Id. at 204.
2& Id. at 209.
Id. (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).
2 Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217.
297 Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972).
[Vol. 4.3
SPEEfCHN EPUBLIC SCHOOLS
clothing bearing the Confederate flag, as long as the punishments
were strictly necessary to prevent potential danger and disruption due
to racial tensions in school.m More recently, in West v. Derly,m the
Tenth Circuit upheld the punishment of a boy for drawing a Confed-
erate flag in math class. The court upheld the punishment under the
Tinker disruption standard, noting that the "district experienced a se-
ries of racial incidents," including a fight that broke out over a Con-
federate flag headband, so that the "policy enacted in response to this
situation was clearly 'something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that accompany an unpopular view-
point."'2° Similarly, in Phillips v. Anderson, a school prohibited a stu-
dent from wearing ajacket bearing a Confederate flag and the court
approved on the grounds of disruption, noting that there had been
several violent racial incidents in the school's recent history.21
Other courts have recognized no exception to the Tinker disrup-
tion standard when considering prohibitions on racially-charged
symbols like the Confederate flag. They have required actual evi-
dence of disruption, and have not allowed schools merely to presume
that the Confederate flag will lead to fights. In Castorina v. Madison
County School Board,23 for example, where a student was suspended for
wearing a Confederate flag T-shirt, the Sixth Circuit overturned a
grant of summary judgment in favor of the school board, on the
ground that issues of fact remained as to whether the school had ac-
tually experienced disruption because of the display of the Confeder-
ate flag.
Banning the Confederate flag might not always pass the Tinker dis-
ruption test. To properly follow Tinker, a court must consider
whether the display of the flags is imminently disruptive, or whether
occasional fights are part of the "hazardous freedom" contemplated
by Justice Fortas.25 While the display of the Confederate flag might
be a "but for" cause of disruption, a court could reasonably deter-
mine that the true cause is the behavior of students who actively chal-
Id. at 1333.
2M West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist., 206 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000).
M Id. at 1232 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cnty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969)).
21 Phillips v. Anderson County Sch. Dist, 987 F. Supp. 488 (D.S.C. 1997).
2 Courts' treatment of the Confederate flag closely parallels their treatment of gang cloth-
ing. See Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997) (invalidat-
ing a "gang-related apparel" dress code provision on the ground that there was insufficient evi-
dence of actual or anticipated disruption);Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp.
1459 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (holding that schools can ban gang clothing if and only if they can show
a gang presence).
Castorina v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2001).
Z4 Id. at 542.
Z Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508.
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lenge those who passively display the flag.2 Courts should take no-
tice of the difference in First Amendment value between displaying
the Confederate flag in dissent from the politically correct ethos and
displaying it to threaten an insular minority.
The Confederate flag cases are yet another example of the vitality
of the Tinker disruption standard. Courts might have carved out a
"racist symbol" exception to Tinker and held, to paraphrase Fraser,
that the First Amendment does not prevent school officials from de-
termining that to permit the display of the Confederate flag would
undermine the school's basic educational mission. They have not.
D. Freedom To Learn and the "Captive Audience"
The disruption standard allows schools to prohibit speech that
"involves substantial... invasion of the lights of others."' There-
fore, consideration of the rights of speakers requires definition of the
rights of the speaker's audience.
What rights against speech do students have that they lack outside
of school, and what rules other than the disruption standard would
protect those rights? To the extent students have a right to receive
an education,m the Tinker disruption standard provides a sufficient
remedy. Non-disruptive passive expression may irk teachers and
make students uncomfortable, but cannot ultimately deprive students
of education. The right to be free from harassment applies differ-
ently in school than on the street, but that too falls under the Tinker
remedy because true harassment is disruptive." There is no right not
to be offended. It has certainly never existed outside the school, 30'
and numerous cases have held that offensive content is an insuffi-
cient ground for punishing speech in school.3 Indeed, if the First
29 But see Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332, 1334 (6th Cir. 1972) (upholding school's decision
to suspend a student who wore a Confederate flagjacket).
W See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986).
2 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
See Kicklighter v. Evans County Sch. Dist., 968 F. Supp. 712, 716 (S.D. Ga. 1997) (holding
that there is no substantive due process right to receive a public school education).
30 See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186 (1 1th Cir. 1996) (validating sexual
harassment claim where the harassment created an abusive educational environment). The
chief state interest in secondary school, non-directed sexual harassment is equality of educa-
tional opportunity. See generally Gant, supra note 245.
301 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
55 (1988); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978); Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576, 592 (1969); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
302 See, e.g., Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 206 (3d
Cir. 2001).
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Amendment's right of free speech is to mean anything, it must mean
that nobody can claim a right not to be offended.303
Students have a right to learn, but they do not have an absolute
right to feel completely comfortable in school. 4  The officials in
Tinker, after all, acted not simply because they disagreed with anti-war
movement, but because they wanted to protect the concentration and
sensibilities of other students. As Justice Black noted in his dissent,
"[o] f course students, like other people, cannot concentrate on lesser
issues when black armbands are being ostentatiously displayed in
their presence to call attention to the wounded and dead of the war,
some of the wounded and the dead being their friends and neigh-
bors."30 If Mary Beth Tinker could make her classmates feel uncom-
fortable, the interest in protecting comfort levels does not outweigh
the interests of free speech. Justice Burger in Fraser noted that a
speaker's rights must be balanced against the sensibilities of the lis-
teners.m Although that may be true, under Tinker, the interests of
the school in maintaining a comfortable environment do not weigh
much in the analytical balance.
The idea that students are a "captive audience" and that their lack
307of choice justifies extra protections from offensive messages ' has
never convinced the Supreme Court. The Court in Tinker showed no
concern for the classmates of John and Mary Beth Tinker who were
forced to be distracted by offensive anti-war armbands in the class-
room. The Court explicitly rejected "captive audience" theory in
Cohen:
[W]e have... consistently stressed that "we are often 'captives' outside
the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech." The
See Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 744-45 (noting that even offensive speech can carry impor-
tant ideas); Street, 394 U.S. at 592 ("It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public
expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to
some of their hearers."); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (upholding free
speech right to protest peacefully but offensively); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11
(1949) (upholding the free speech right to harangue and holding that "[f]reedom of speech
undoubtedly means freedom to express views that challenge deep-seated, sacred beliefs and to
utter sentiments that may provoke resentment"); Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist., 755 F.2d 1356, 1363
(9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 478 U.S. at 681 ("Although we may be offended by some of what we see
and hear, that is a price we must pay for the privilege of living in a free and open pluralistic so-
ciety."); Schwartz v. Schuker, 298 F. Supp. 238, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) ("In our system of govern-
ment, there is no right to suppress or censor speech or expressions even though they may be
hateful or offensive to those in authority or opposed by the majority.").
30 The First Amendment itself is educational; it cultivates "thick skin." See LEE BOLUNGER,
THE TOLERANF SOCIEMY FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMISt SPEECH IN AMERICA 10 (1986)
(noting that protecting "free speech involves a special act of carving out one area of social in-
teraction for extraordinary self-restraint, the purpose of which is to develop and demonstrate a
social capacity to control feelings evoked by a host of social encounters").
545 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524.
306 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.
See, e.g., Meiklejohn, supra note 58, at 1222.
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ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to shut off dis-
course solely to protect others from hearing it is, in other words, de-
pendent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being in-
vaded in an essentially intolerable manner. Any broader view of this
authority would effectively empower a m%0ority to silence dissidents sim-
ply as a matter of personal predilections.
Privacy interests are not implicated by nondisruptive speech directed
passively at a general audience, as when expressions appear on cloth-
ing. Justice Harlan emphasized in Cohen that people usually surren-
der their privacy interest to be free from speech when they go out in
public. There is especially no interest in avoiding visual messages:
"It]hose in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively avoid further
bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." A
school is little different from a courthouse in this respect. 1 Thus,
the "captive audience" theory does not entitle students to a level of
comfort greater than that afforded by the Court in Tinker. Students
have a right to learn, but not a right against having their opinions
challenged.
CONCLUSION
A. The Tinker Standard
Although the school must abide by the same constitutional con-
straints that protect adult speech, the rights of students and adults
are not coextensive. Children in school hold an unabridged set of
constitutional rights, though the Constitution takes on different
meaning inside the school. First Amendment rights are not so much
curtailed in as they are molded to the school environment."' The ju-
risprudence of student free expression, therefore, does not exist in
isolation. Judges can determine the extent of constitutional protec-
tions for students by asking first whether adults would have the right
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (citing Rowan v. Post Office, 397 U.S. 728, 738
(1970)).
"o Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
310 But see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1974) (finding that passen-
gers on a bus are a captive audience); Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 454 (1952)
(upholding the practice of private streetcar companies of playing radio programs in streetcars,
despite the captive nature of the audience); Brian A. Freeman, Note, The Supreme Court and First
Amendment Rights of Students in the Public School Classroom: A Proposed Model of Analysis, 12
HASMIGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 20-21 (1984) ("Regulations of speech upheld under the captive audi-
ence rationale are not intended to restrict ideas and beliefs, but rather to protect the privacy
interests of individuals. This rationale permits persons to decline to receive ideas, information,
and messages that they do not want to receive.").
31 As Justice Fortas wrote, "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment, are available to... students." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (emphasis added).
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to speak the message, and if the answer is yes, by asking what differ-
ences, if any, exist between the environment of the school and the
environments of the adult in which constitutional protections have
been applied in the past.
As this Comment has demonstrated, this mode of analysis leads to
the conclusion that the Tinker disruption standard, and nothing
more, should govern the school's regulation of independent student
speech. Although many courts have interpreted Fraser to carve out an
exception to the Tinker disruption standard for vulgar speech in any
context, the Hazelwood case clarified Fraseis holding, confining it to
the school-sponsored context.312 Without this limiting construction,
the Fraser precedent could be used to justify not only restrictions on
"vulgar" speech, but any restrictions that meet the expansive ration-
ales offered by Chief Justice Burger in Fraser.3 3 By surveying case law
in cases of non-vulgar speech, I have shown that the "vulgarity" rule
that courts have taken from Fraser stands as the lone exception to the
Tinker disruption standard, which continues to govern all other areas
of student speech, even those where the governmental interest in
suppression may be greater and the student's interest in expression
may be less. *4
A vulgarity exception is irreconcilable with other law. In consider-
ing cases of non-vulgar independent student speech, courts have ap-
plied general First Amendment principles to the school context, of-
ten deciding in favor of students. Only when considering "vulgar"
student speech have courts applied rationales that are inconsistent
with the larger body of First Amendment law. Hence, there can be a
case like my own, Pyle v. School Committee,3 15 where the judge applied
standards from adult free speech cases 31 to the secondary school con-
text for the first time, striking a victory for student free speech by in-
validating a speech code provision prohibiting "demeaning" mes-
sages, yet at the same time felt compelled to apply Fraser, striking a
312 Courts are starting to interpret Fraser and Hazelwood in this matter, by applying the disrup-
don standard to cases where schools have punished students for creating independent web
pages containing allegedly vulgar material. See, e.g., Beussink v. Woodland R-1V Sch. Dist., 30 F.
Supp. 2d 1175, 1180 (E.D. Mo. 1998) (granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff where
the school district failed to show that the student's web site containing "crude and vulgar lan-
guage" was disruptive). Cf. Killion v. Franklin Regional Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D.
Pa. 2001) (interpreting Fraser to ban vulgar language on school premises categorically, but hold-
ing that a student could not be punished for creating a vulgar web site because it was off school
premises). For a discussion of student web site cases, see David L. Hudson,Jr., Censorship of Stu-
dent Internet Speech: The Effect of Diminishing Student Rights, Fear of the Internet and Columbine, 2000
DE. C.L. REV. 199 (2000).
313 Seediscussion supra notes 166-71 and accompanying text.
14 See supra Section Ill.
315 Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157 (D. Mass. 1994).
316 See discussion supra notes 268-79.
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blow to student free speech by approving a speech code provision
prohibiting "vulgar" messages. The former holding suggests that stu-
dents and adults hold the same rights, and that the court's task is to
scrutinize the school's justifications according to First Amendment
law. The latter holding suggests that where student speech is "vul-
gar," the court's task is not to apply First Amendment law to the
school context, but rather to apply the Fraser rationales, under which
First Amendment law is irrelevant and the school's justifications
should not be scrutinized. This discrepancy raises a question: is the
school just another context for the application of general First
Amendment rights, or are the rights of students fundamentally dif-
ferent so that there need not be consistency between student free
speech law and general free speech law? The bulk of precedent sug-
gests that free speech is limited in public schools because the context
is special, not because students' essential rights are degraded. If so,
the Fraser holding turns on the school-sponsored nature of the
speech, and the latest Supreme Court case on the issue of independ-
ent non-disruptive student expression is Tinker.
B. Student Speech and the Courts
School officials make countless disciplinary decisions every day,
and cannot be expected to consult with attorneys frequently. Thus,
the First Amendment must reduce to a simple rule if it is both to
mean something and have an effect in the school. I have argued in
this Comment that the Tinker disruption standard is the one and only
standard mandated by the Supreme Court, but it is also simply more
practical for governing non-school-sponsored speech than any new
standard that could be gleaned from Justice Burger's opinion in
Fraser. A school administrator is in a good position to determine
when speech has caused a material and substantial disruption, but in
a poor position to balance the "freedom to advocate unpopular and
controversial views" against "society's countervailing interest in teach-
ing students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.
"317
School administrators could hardly avoid trampling on the First
Amendment if their only legal tests were Justice Burger's balancing
standard. 318 The Tinker standard is sufficiently clear that school offi-
cials will know they are violating the Constitution when they decide to
punish students for their independent, non-disruptive messages.
Regardless of the prevailing legal standard, schools have no rea-
son to fear lawsuits challenging everyday exercises of school disci-
317 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986).
318 Justice Black's reasonable time, place, and manner standard, articulated in his Tinker dis-
sent, is similarly vague and unworkable. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 522.
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pline. Their power to maintain order gives them a virtually un-
checked abilit to take action against students who directly disrupt
the classroom.3'9 Their power to design and teach a curriculum gives
them the ability to sponsor an official and pervasive school culture.
Schools may go to great lengths to censor school-sponsored speech or
independent speech that disrupts the classroom. When teachers and
principals push the boundaries of the First Amendment, they do so in
knowing attempts to promote values, not to preserve order. Litiga-
tion results, unsurprisingly and appropriately.
Still, many find the idea of free speech lawsuits and public educa-
tion incongruous and not rooted in history. They are repulsed by the
idea that students can seek judicial review in federal court from the
decisions of their historically autonomous local school boards.32 ° Jus-
tice Black, an ardent believer in free speech, believed that the school
may take action against any form of speech which "distracted from
that singleness of purpose which the State... desired to exist in its
public educational institutions."s21 He was correct to point out that
schools historically were total institutions. In the past, learning was
not the well-studied psychological process it is today, but rather a
process of molding children into adults by force. Teachers made no
distinction between the teaching of morals and the teaching of sub-
jects; even the multiplication tables were taught by the stick. How-
ever, the concept of student free speech rights should not be deemed
an innovation of liberal 1960's judicial activism that paralleled the
development of more permissive pedagogical methods.3 The most
319 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 662 (1977) (holding that corporal punishment may
be used if "reasonably necessary 'for the proper education of the child and for the maintenance
of roup discipline'") (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1989) (noting that local school offi-
cials are better suited than the courts to determine proper values to emphasize in each school);
Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803, 810 (2d Cir. 1971) (finding likely disruption to
educational process if school administrators were forced to litigate each anticipated disrup-
tion); Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 170 (D. Mass. 1994) (stating that "the
limits on vulgarity in secondary schools... are to be determined by school administrators);
Buckv. Bd. of Educ., 553 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1977) (opining that courts should not interfere with
public education or any other local procedure which provides the constitutional minimum of
protection). See also David Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against
Judicial Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REV. 477 (1981) (arguing that Tinker was incorrect and that
courts should exercise a more limited review of local school administration). But see Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943) (questioning the allegiance of local school
boards to the Constitution).
S2 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 524 (BlackJ, dissenting).
Seegenerally ESSAYS ON EDUCATION INTHE EARLYREPUBLIC (Frederick Rudolph ed., 1965).
In one of the first student speech cases, in 1908, two students published a poetical parody
of the school rules in the local newspaper. The court found there was no abuse of authority,
but rather an attempt to discipline students for their own good and the good of the school. In
articulating an early version of the Tinker disruption standard, the court held that the students
could be suspended for out-of-school actions if it influences the conduct of pupils inside the
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eloquent judicial exposition of student rights came not during the
liberal period of the 1960s, but during wartime, from Justice Jackson
in a 1943 case protecting the right of a student to refuse to recite the
Pledge of Allegiance:
That [schools] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scru-
pulous protection of constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are
not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount
324important principles of our government as mere platitudes.
school and brings the teachers into ridicule and contempt. State v. Dist. Bd. of Sch. Dist. No. 1,
116 N.W. 232 (Wis. 1908). Courts today would probably not accept the claim that a poem
mocking school rules would truly affect behavior. It is interesting to note that the school was
held to a fairly high standard, even if the application of the facts to the standard was clouded by
the prevailing view of the purpose of education.
324 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637.
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